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FOREVORD 
This  collection of  papers  was  developed  in support  of  an  IATRC  task force 
report  on  the  possible applications of an  aggregate  measure  of support 
(AMS)  to negotiating policy  reform in  the Uruguay  Round.  The  task force 
report  is published separately  by  the  IATRC  as  "Bringing Agriculture into 
the  GATT:  Potential Use  of an  Aggregate  Measure  of  Support." 
The  Task  force  draws  on  this collection to illustrate or emphasize  certain 
points  related  to  how  well  the  AMs  measures  or captures  the effects of 
particular policies or policy changes.  The  task force  felt  that  including 
these examples  in  their entirety would  make  the final report overly  long 
and  technical for  a  policymaker audience.  It also  thought,  however,  that 
they would  be  of sufficient interest  to an academic  audience  to warrant 
their joint publication as  an  IATRC  Vorking  Paper.  The  executive summary 
of  the  task force  report  is also  included  in this document. 
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Economics THE  AGGREGATE  MEASURE  OF  SUPPORT: 
POTENTIAL  USE  BY  GATT  FOR  AGRICULTURE 
Executive  Summary 
The  Uruguay  Round  differs  from  past  Rounds  in its recognition  that  trade 
problems  have  their roots  in a  wide  range  of  domestic  as  well  as  trade 
policy  instruments.  This  recognition signalled  the  need  for  a  measurement 
device  that  would  tell us  considerably more  about  government  intervention 
in agriculture  than  we  learn  from  tariffs or  simple nominal  protection 
coefficients,  but  that  would  require  considerably less  information  than 
that  needed  by  many  economic  models.  Extensive work  at  the  OECD  on 
producer  subsidy equivalents  (PSE's)  encouraged negotiators  to  find  a 
formal  role  in  the negotiations  for  an  aggregate 'index of-this  type. 
Criticisms of  the  PSE  (as  we  know- it)  produced  suggestions  that  there might 
be  some  other aggregate measure  of support  (AMS)  more  suitable  to  be  cast 
as  an  instrument  of negotiation.  As  the Round  has  progressed,  there  has 
been  very little disagreement  over  the  need  for  some  AMS,  but  relatively 
little agreement  over what  its explicit role or key  characteristics should 
be.  Indeed,  different  roles  may  well call for different characteristics. 
The  use  of  an  AMS  as  a  negotiating device suggests  a  package  approach  to 
policy  reform or,  at  a  minimum,  an  interest on  the  part  of negotiators  in 
the  full  range  of  policy  instruments affecting agricultural markets.  This 
is  a  marked  addition  to  past  practice and  complements  the  traditional 
request  and  offer approach and  efforts  to  write  rules strictly regulating 
particular policy  instruments.  The  AMS  approach offers  the  possibility of 
broad  based,  across-the-board  policy  reform  that  avoids  misinformation and 
special interest group  domination and,  at  the  same  time,  offers countries 
flexibility in  their  choice of  approaches  to  reform.  (Flexibility is 
greater  the larger  the  policy set  included  in  the  AMS).  The  strength of an 
AMS  approach  is its flexibility.  Its greatest potential weaknesses  are  (1) 
particularly egregious  policy  instruments  may  remain  in place  and  (2) 
policy switching could,  in  theory,  produce greater  trade disruptions  than 
those  we  currently  face.  Additionally,  a'  range "of- technica3:"problems  must 
be  confronted  before  the  AMS  approach  can  be-made  operationa!.--
Broadly,  what  are  the  possible roles  for  an  AMS?  Monitoring is at  one  end 
of  a spectrum of possible roles  for  the  AMS.  A monitoring  role means  that 
an  AMS  is used  to  keep  track of  how  countries  are doing  in meeting 
commitments  that  may  have  been  made  through  any  number  of negotiating 
approaches,  or merely  to  keep  watch  on  the agricultural policy picture in 
relation  to  trends  and  events  in world  markets.  Disciplines  might  be 
imposed  on  countries  not  meeting  commitments,  as  indicated  by  the  AMS,  but 
these  would  be  external  to  the  AMS  itself. 
At  the  opposite  end  of  the  spect~um of  possible  roles  is  the  AMS  as  a 
legally-bound  instrument  of nego- _~tion.  In  this  role,  the  AMS  takes  the 
part of  a  tariff schedule  for  agriculture.  ~ith no  other accompanying 
restrictions on  policy  instruments,  this  role gives  countries  flexibility 
in  choosing  policy  instruments.  Accompanying  rules,  for  example  on  policy 
switching,  could  be  necessary  to  assure  that  AMS  reductions  coincide with 
reductions  in  trade distortions. 
Intermediate  roles  include  the  AMS  as  a  "triggering"  or  "crediting" device. 
Triggering  suggests  a  more  formal  role  for  the  AMS  in  the  monitoring 
1 process,  whereby  parties would  be  bound  to  take  some  prescribed action 
signalled  by  a  predesignated  change  in  the  AMS.  The  AMS  is used  in  this 
way  in  the  U.S.-Canada  Free Trade  Agreement.  The  AMS  could also  be  used  to 
quantify  "credits" or  "debits"  extended  to  countries  for  policy changes 
made  since  the negotiations  began  or since some  negotiated  base  period. 
AMS  Measures 
The  first of  the  AMS  measures  proposed  for  GATT  use  is  the  Producer  Subsidy 
Equivalent  (PSE)  as  used  in  the Trade  Mandate  Study  by  the  OECD.  The  PSE 
is defined  as  the  payment  needed  to  compensate  farm  producers  for  the  loss 
of  income  resulting  from  removal  of  a  given policy measure.  The  other  two 
proposed measures  are variations of  the  PSE  concept.  The  Trade Distortion 
Equivalent  (TDE),  as  proposed  by  Canada,  is a  PSE  applied  only  to  policy 
measures  agreed  to  be  significantly  trade distorting,  and  it would  take 
into account  the effect of supply control measures.  The  Support 
Measurement  Unit  (SMU)  as  defined  by  theEC; like  the TDE,  focuses  on 
policies  that significantly affect  farmers'  production decisions  and  takes 
account  of  the effects of supply control measures.  It further adjusts  the 
PSE  to  remove  the effects of exogenous  world  price and  currency 
fluctuations. 
The  exact definition of an  AMS  should  be  determined  by  the use  to which it 
is put.  For  example: 
If the  interest is: 
a  measure  of  the 
level of  total support 
a  measure  of  trade 
distorting support 
a  measure  or  trade 
distorting support  and 
changes  in  that support, .. 
due  to  policy  change 








Then  an appropirate measure  might  be: 
PSE,  TDE,  SMU,  or Other  (The 
more  information  to under-
stand what  is happening,  the 
better.) 
TDE,  SMU 
SMU  (No  country will  bind  a 
commitment  on  a  basis  that it 
cannot  control.) 
The  PSE  or  one  of  its variants has  benefited  from  significant definition of 
calculation methodology,  economic  assumptions  and  agreement  on  concepts. 
The  extent  of  further  agreement  required  on  such  items  for  use of  the  PSE-
type  AMS  is likely  to  be  much  less  than  for  use of  other measures,  such as 
tariff equivalents  or effective rates of protection,  where  agreement  on 
such arcane  concepts  as elasticities and  value-added  coefficients  may  be 
2 ,> 
needed.  Nonetheless  a  significant set of  issues  remain  to  be  classified 
and  negotiated  before a  specific AMS  will be  acceptable  in an  operational 
role. 
How  to  make  AMSs  operational 
If incorporated  into  GATT  rules,  then  a  well-functioning  AMS  would  need  to 
be  defined  that  balanced  the  tradeoffs  between  simplicity and  accuracy  in 
reflecting  the  levels  and  changes  in support.  Simplicity is needed  because 
with  more  complex  and  less clear measures,  policymakers  and  observers  would 
have  more  difficulty linking causes  (policy changes)  with effects  (changes 
in AMS),  thus  making  the  measure  less useful.  On  the  other hand,  there are 
many  conceptual  and  technical  problems  associated with defining an  AMS. 
The  tradeoff  between  simplicity and  accuracy likely will be  difficult  to 
achieve. 
If an  AMS  is  to  play  an  important  role  in GATT  rules,  then  the  most 
important  of  these  concepts  and  problems  must  be  agreed  upon  by  the 
negotiating parties.  The  most  important  issues  include: 
*  An  AMS  can  change  for  two  reasons;  (a)  a  change  in "specified" 
policies or  (b)  a  change  in other policies or  market  conditions. 
Shall changes  in  (b)  be  included  in  the  measure  of  AMS  or held 
constant?  What  are  "specified"  policies? 
*  If  the  "other policies and  market  conditions"  are  to  be  held 
constant,  a  key  issue is what  reference price and  base  period 
should  be  used? 
*  This  become  a  critical issue if the objective of  the  AMS  is  to 
measure  trade distortion and  the  role is more  than  informal 
monitoring. 
*  Shall governments  be  allowed  to  increase any  specific policy 
intervention -- i.e.,  would  policy switching be  allowed within a 
negotiated overall AMS'level?· 
*  How  should  production control be  measured? 
All  the  technical  problems  raised  above  can  be  solved  to  some  degree  of 
satisfaction.  But  these  technical  problems  are serious.  The  information 
requirements  are also substantial.  Meeting  the data needs  in a  timely way 
would  be  very difficult,  even  in  the  industrial countries.  Still,  we  have 
some  evidence  that  an  AMS  has  a  place in  trade negotiations -- the United 
States and  Canada  included an  AMS  in  their free  trade agreement. 
If GATT  is  to  use  the  AMS  concept  in some  way,  institutional arrangements 
would  need  to  be  specified -- who  would  compute  AMSs  and  when. 
3 SUMMARY  OF  COLLECTED  PAPERS 
In  the  Mid-Term  Review  Agreement  on  Agriculture,  reached  in Geneva  in 
April  1989,  GATT  Ministers  agreed  to  pursue agricultural policy reform  and 
to  assign credit  for  " ...  measures  implemented  since  the  Punta del Este 
Declaratio~,which contribute positively  to  the  reform  programme".  Most  of 
the  papers  included  in  this  collection address  the  problem  of  using an 
aggregate  measure  of  support  (AMS)  to ascertain  the  value of credit 
associated with  particular policy changes.  Most  look at current  methods 
used  in :calculating  producer·subsidy~ equivalents  (PSE's). and  discuss  the 
shortcomings  of  these  methods  when  c6n~ideting the trade effects of 
particular policies.  The  ~olicy set considered  includes various  supply 
control  schemes,  frozen  U.s.  program yields,  the  U.s.  export  enhancement 
program,  and  EC  financial stabilizers. 
The  first  paper  looks  at  problems  in using  the  AMS  as  a  measure  of 
trade-distortions  (or as  an  indicator of reductions  in  trade distortions 
due  to  policy changes)  when  supply controls are present.  With  a  simple 
graphical example,  Don  McClatchy  makes  the  point  that it is  possible  to 
have  a  high measured  PSE  and  little or no  production,  consumption,  or  trade 
distortion.  This  is because  supply  controls  can significantly reduce  the 
level of  production and  trade distortion which  would  otherwise occur if the 
effects of  the price or  income  support  program  were  not  constrained. 
McClatchy  argues  that ,  in principle,  AMS'r'eduction  obligations' should  be 
proportional  to  the level of production distortion generated  by  the support 
pack~g: and  he  demonstrates  that relatively straightforward,  pragmatic 
approaches  do  exist  to  determine  "approximately"  the effect of supply 
controls on  reducing  the level of  production distortion.  Once  this effect 
has  been  ascertained,  credit  for  the distortion-reducing effects of supply 
controls  could  be  granted  in  the  form  of downward  adjustments  in  AMS 
reduction  commitments.  Yhat  McClatchy  has  done,  essentially,  is  to  suggest 
an  adjustment  factor  that  could  be  used  in  the  conversion of PSE's  to 
TOE's.  It's a  simple  concept,  but  it does  rely  on  negotiations  over  what 
countries'  production would  have  been  in  the  absence  of  the  supply 
controls. 
The  second  paper,  by  Tom  Hertel  and  Marinos  Tsigas,  looks  explicitly 
at alternative  types  of  supply  controls used  in  U.s.  agriculture and  asks 
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if they all have  the  same  effect on  trade.  Hertel and  Tsigas  argue  that 
alternative  forms  of  supply control affect  productive  capacity and  trade 
differently.  They  warn  that  supply  controls  may  not  provide  the  incentives 
necessary  to  move  resources  into alternative uses  and,  as  a  consequence, 
may  only  temporarily curtail supply.  u.s.  acreage controls,  for  example, 
have historically  tended  to  increase  productive  capacity  by  promoting 
higher-yield agriculture;  but  u.s.  output  quota  schemes  (e.g.,  that  now 
used  in  the  tobacco  program)  tend  to  reduce  productive  capacity  (provided 
the quotas  are  tradeable)  because  they  encourage  lower-input agriculture 
and  a  slower  rate of growth  in yields.  Domestic  marketing quotas  (used, 
for  example,  in  the  U.S.  p~anut program)  are  themost  trade-distorting form 
of  supply control  they  consider.  Such  programs  encourage surplus disposal 
because sales  to  export  markets  are not  restricted.  The  main  message  is 
that negotiators  must  be  very careful  to  fully understand  the  implications 
of  any  particular supply control  program  before granting credit  for it. 
Another  message  is  that,  even  if supply-control adjustment  factors  are 
derived,  AMS's  are still likely  to  tell incomplete stories about  the 
effects of  policy  reform  on  the  movement  of agricultural resources  into 
more  productive uses. 
Hertel and  Tsigas  go  on,  in  the  third paper  to discuss  a  key  aspect of 
the  u.S.  wheat  program:  the  freezing  of  program yields.  This  U.S.  policy 
change,  implemented after 1985,  began  the  process  of  "decoupling" 
defi~~~nc.y  ..  paYDl~IH~  ;.roJ~fp.r.1JI,PE9d.~c;,~J9n_ qe.c,i,s;ions  becau,se  farmers  no 
longer have  the  incentive  to  increase yields-in order .to ,qualify. for higher 
payments.  In fact,  Hertel and  Tsigas  argue  that  the  freeze  on  yields 
reduces  input  use  by  program  participants,  thereby  lowering output  and 
export  levels.  They  conclude  that  an  AMS  which  counts all deficiency 
payments  would  be  misleading as  a  trade distortion index,  and  that whatever 
AMS  is used  must  be  adjusted  in order  to  credit  the  United  States  for 
having  frozen  program  yields.  They  warn,  however,  that  the  permanency  of 
this  policy action is still uncertain and  that if credit is  to  be  given it 
should  be  accompanied  by  a  bound  commitment  to  the yield  freeze. 
In  paper  number  four,  Nicole  Ballenger  and  Stephanie  Mercier  consider 
u.s.  export  enhancement  program  (EEP)  in  the  context  of  an  AMS.  They  use 
this  example  to  demonstrate  the  interdependence among  the  numerous 
components  of  the u.s.  Producer  Subsidy  Equivalent  (PSE).  For  example, 
6 when  the  EEP  is  changed  it affects u.s.  deficiency  payments,  storage 
payments,  and  CCC  loan  forfeitures  through  the effect  on  market  prices. 
This  makes  it difficult  to  measure  with  precision  the  credit  (or debit) 
associated with  the EEP. 
Ballenger and  Mercier  also  point  to  problems  applying a  fixed 
reference price  AMS  to  the  EEP.  Unlike administered  price programs,  the 
EEP  lacks  fixed  program  parameters,  aside  from  occasional  budget  caps.  The 
PSE  calculation for  the  EEP  relies on  observations of  the ~  post  subsidy. 
If-reference prices are -tobe-£ixed,  then  some ,decision rule_relating  the 
EEP  subsidy  rate  to  the  refer~rtt. prite must-be "devised  in order  to 
calculate  the  EEP  component  of  the AMS. 
In  the  fifth paper,  Louis  Mahe  and  Herve  Guyomard  take  on  the  supply 
control  problem  from  a  somewhat  different perspective  than McClatchy.  Like 
McClatchy,  they  argue  that  when  policy  instruments  are  both quantities and 
prices,  rather  than  prices only,  the  familiar  PSE  is not  very useful  for 
measuring credits.  They  show  that when  production quotas  are in place,  the 
total income  transfer,  or  PSE,  can  be  decomposed  into a  "decoupled 
transfer"  and  a  "supply-distorting transfer".  As  its name  suggest,  the 
supply-distorting transfer is  the  part which  is responsible for  supply 
increases above  free  trade levels.  It is this part,  they argue,  that  must 
be  measured  in order  to  credit countries  for  reform of  these  types  of 
programs.  Unlike McClatchy,these authors'would'rely on" calculations of 
shadow  prices associated with  the quota. rights  rather  than  on  estimates of 
what  production would  have  been  in the absence of  the quota.  If a  market 
for  quota rights exists,  these shadow  prices  might  be  observed;  otherwise, 
they must  be  estimated with economic  models.  The  authors  estimate credits 
for  EC  policy measures  taken  between  1986  and  1988. 
Fabrizio  De  Filippis  and  Luca  Salvatici  continue  the  above  theme  in 
paper  six.  They  discuss  key  Ee  policy  changes,  including supply  control 
measures  such as  quotas  for  dairy  and  sugar,  and  optional set-aside, 
extensification and  pre-retirement,  and  budget  measures  such  as  co-
responsibility levies  and  financial stabilizers.  The  effects of  these 
measures  show  up  differently  in  the  PSE  as  curre~tly calculated,  and  the 
authors  argue  that  the  PSE  is more  sensitive  to  the effects of  the 
financial stabilizers  than  to  those of quotas. 
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De  Filippis and  Salvatici show  that  the  effects of  production  quotas 
are not  captured  in  the  Ee's  percent  PSE.  However,  if only  the  numerator 
of  the  PSE  (that  is,  the  total PSE)  is used,  the quota effects do  register. 
Noting  that  total PSE's  are not  good  bases  for  comparisons  across 
countries,  the authors  return  to  the  notion  that  percent  PSE's  might  be 
adjusted  to  account  for  distortion-reducing effects of supply controls with 
methods  like  those  suggested  by  our other authors. 
PSE's  are much  better,  these authors  show,  at crediting  the Ee  for  its 
financial stabilizers--programs-that  reduce. the price paid  to  farmers  and 
impose  co-responsibility levies when  predesignated  p+oduction quantities 
are overshot--than for  its production controls.  They  also conclude,  using 
estimates of  changes  in  the  total PSE  for  cereals,  that  the Ee  set-aside 
program  does little, at least currently,  to  control Ee  oversupply. 
The  last paper  by  Martin Johnson,  Terry Roe  and  Louis  Mahe,  departs 
totally from  examination  of  the  AMS  as  a  measurement  device.  It specifies 
particular sets of  policy changes  in  two  negotiating countries,  in  this 
case  the U.S.  and  the  Ee,  in a  game  theory  context.  Political weights  are 
assigned  to  reflect  the  relative levels of  influence in  the negotiation  by 
producers,  consumers  and  taxpayers  and  gains  and  losses  for  each of  these 
groups  are calculated  for  each  combination of policy changes.  The  result 
is a  net gain. or; loss  to ,each ,count  ry. .. ,from.,. under  taking .. poli.cy.  .. ,changes  in 
light of policy changes  made  by  the other country.  The  paper-demonstrates  .~ 
a  bilateral "request  and  offer" approach  to  the negotiation.  These  authors 
find-that  in  the absence of  compensatory  payments,  mutually advantageous 
agreement  between  these  two  parties seems  to exist only  for  marginal 
changes  in agricultural policies.  The  possibility of obtaining GATT 
agreement  on  more  substantial reform  is greatly increased,  they  contend,  if 
budget  savings are  used  to  compensate  the politically powerful  losers. 
Their results suggest  that  AMS's,  at a  very  minimum,  constitute a  crucial 
information  base. 
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APPLYING  THE  AMS  TO  SUPPORT  PROGRAMS  INCORPORATING  SUPPLY  CONTROLS 
Don  McClatchy 
A given level of  income  support  (PSE)  can  be  associated with  trade 
effects  ranging all  the  way  from  negligible  to substantial,  depending  on 
the  type  of  policy  instrument  used.  The  extreme  of high  income  support 
associated with  negligible  trade effects is illustrated  by  the  example  (see 
Annex  A)  of a  program  providing deficiency payment  support  for  production 
effectively controlled at  the  level which  would  be  forthcoming  if producers 
were  to  face  world  equivalent  .. pdcesfor their  ..  product  (and  assuming 
consumption  occurs at world  equivalent prices).  In  practice,  there exist 
instances of support  for  managed  levels of supply which  approach  to  varying 
degrees  this  theoretical extreme.  Obligations  to  reduce  such support 
should  reflect  the degree  to which  trade is in fact,  distorted. 
Adjustments  to  formula-based  AMS  reduction commitments  would  be  appropriate 
.  h  1  1n  suc  cases. 
The  case of  production or marketing control  programs,  at least, 
provides  an  example  where  the needed  adjustment  is straightforward and 
simple.  The  effect of such  measures  on  production is often both 
substantial and  estimable  to  a  reasonable degree of  accuracy.  In 
situations where  effective marketing or production control exists,  it is 
proposed  that special rules  and  procedures  for  AMS  calculation be  adopted. 
1.Ideally,  an  AMD  (Aggregate  Measure  of Distortion)  rather  than  an  AMS 
might  be  used  in  the  GATT  negotiations.  Such  a  measure  would  conceivably 
formally  account  for  key  factors  determining  the  trade volume  distortion 
generated  by  any  given  farm  support  program,  such  as  demand  side price 
distortion  (as sell as  supply side price distortion)  and  values  of  the 
relevant  supply  and  demand  elasticities.  However,  member  countries  are 
generally in agreement  that  such sophistication would  not  be  practicable 
in  the  GATT  context.  Yhile  AMS  details  remain  to  be  worked  out,  the  idea 
that it be  a  modified/simplified  PSE  seems  to  be  generally accepted.  In 
other words,  a  measure  of  production support  is  proposed  to  be  used  as  a 
proxy  for  the  level of  trade distortion.  Having  accepted  this,  it would 
seem  sensible  to  make  adjustments  to  AMS  reduction  commitments  in cases 
where  the  measured  level of  production support  bears little logical 
relationship  to  the  level of  trade distortion generated  by  that  support. 
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At  their option,  countries  could  present  their estimates  of: 
A.  Their  base  period  production  level if their  farmers  had  faced 
world  equivalent  prices,  and 
B.  Their  base  period  production level if their  farmers  had  enjoyed 
existing support  levels without  supply constraints. 
These  estimates would  be  subject  to  cross-examination  by,  and  negotiation 
with,  other countries. 
Once  agreement  had  been  reached,  they would  then  be  used  in 
conjunction with: 
C.  Observed  (actual)  base  period  production. level .under.supply 
controls. 
The  base  period  AMS  would  be  multiplied  by  the  factor  (C-A)/(B-A). 
The  depth  of  cut  would  then  be  applied  to  the  product  of  this 
multiplication,  to  calculate  the appropriate  AMS  reduction  commitment. 
This  reduction  would  then  be  subtracted  from  the  base  period  AMS  to 
determine  the  target  level of  AMS  for  the  end  of  the  transition period.  At 
the  same  time,  rules  should  be  developed  to  ensure  that  AMS  reduction 
commitments  could  only  be  satisfied in ways  that  would  result  in reduced 
adverse  trade effects.  This  proposal is elaborated  in Annex  B. 
It may  at first sight appear  that countries  could  be  expected  to  argue 
that C was  equal  to  A,  since  this would  have  the effect of eliminating 
their AMS  reduction  commi tments(i  ~'e~,  put 'them-in"trre'zero,,-,distortion 
situation illustrated in Annex  A).  However,  to so argue would  also  be  to 
implicitly admit  that  none  of  the price support  provided  to  their producers 
was  necessary  in order  to generate domestic supplies at  current levels. 
Similarly,  to argue  that  domestic  producers  need  all the  price support  they 
get  in order  to generate current  production levels would  be  to  concede  that 
B was  equal  to  A,  that  the  supply  controls were  non-constraining and, 
therefore,  that  no  downward  adjustment  in  AMS  reduction  commitments  would 
be  appropriate  (i.e.,  to  admit  to  being equally as  distorting as  the 
country  providing open  ended  support at  the  same  per unit level).  In light 
of  such  considerations,  it seems  likely  to  be  quite  reasonable,  reflecting 
a  balance  being struck between  the  above  arguments.  For  example,  if A were 
put  at  zero,  which  seems  quite possible,  it is unlikely  that  B would  be 
reduction  commitment  unreasonably  low. 
10 The  argument  that  a  supply  management  program  may  be  inefficient  or 
ineffective in  one  way  or another  is  irrelevant.  Most  agricultural support 
measures  can  be  criticized along  the  same  lines.  As  long as  the objective 
of  the  GATT  negotiations  is  reducing adverse  trade effects of measures, 
then  measures  with  small  trade effects  should  remain  relatively unaffected 
by  GATT  disciplines  and  commitments,  irrespective of  how  poorly  they may 
stand  up  to  scrutiny under  other criteria. 
Looked  at  another  way,  there  is  no  point  in forcing  AMS  reductions if 
no  benefits  to  trade would  be 'derived.  This  suggests  the  need,  at least, 
for  rules  to  ensure  that  AMS  reduction  commitments  be  achieved  in ways 
which  would  benefit other countries.  By  the  same  token,  the  commitment  to 
reduce  should  be  based  only  on  the  scope which  exists  for  AMS  reductions 
which  would  be  beneficial  to  tradittg partners,  where  this is less  than  the 
total scope  for  AMS  reduction.  For  example,  suppose  farm  level production 
or  marketing quotas  were  associated with  a  direct  (e.g.  deficiency)  payment 
support  program.  In such  a  case,  assuming  the quotas  were  binding,  no 
reduction  in production and  trade volume  distortions  could  be  expected  to 
result  from  (marginal)  reductions  in  the  level of  per unit direct  payments 
(if the  supply  control was  voluntary,  - say  by  way  of meeting set-aside 
requirements  as  a  condition  for  receiving deficiency payments,  - program 
participation may  even  fall,  and  production distortion level  increase,  as  a 
result of reductions  in  target  prices).  Thus,  in such  a  situation,  it is 
suggested  that  reducing  the  aggregate  level of  production or marketing 
quotas  (or  increasing  the  percent  set-aside requirements  in  the  case of  the 
volu~tary program)  would  be  an  acceptable method  of achieving AMS  reduction 
commitments.  Per unit direct  payment  reductions,  on  the other hand,  would 
not. 
Another  conceivable  example  would  be  where  mandatory  supply  control 
was  associated with  farm  level support  provided  via a  combination  of 
domestic market  price support  and  direct government  payments.  Then~  AMS 
reductions  would  be  trade distortion-reducing if achieved  by  means  of 
reductions  in  the  level of  aggregate  supply  quota or via  reductions  in  the 
supported  level  of  domestic  prices,  but  not  if achieved  through  reduction 
in  the  level  of direct  payments. 
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Thus,  it is proposed  that if a  country was  to apply  for  and  be granted 
some  "credit"  (in  the  form  of  reduced  AMS  reduction obligations)  for  the 
fact  that it implemented  some  form  of supply control as  part of its overall 
support  package,  such credit would  be  conditional on  it achieving its AMS 
reduction  through  means  which  would  further  reduce  any  remaining  production 
and  trade distortions. 
12 ANNEX  A:  THE  EXTREME  CASE  OF  A HIGH  TOTAL  PSE  ASSOCIATED  VITH  NO  TRADE 
EFFECTS 
- q 
_P.w __  ------ .. 
Pd  = Price  to  farmers  (supported via deficiency  payments) 
Pw  = Yorld  market  equivalent price 
Q  = Controlled  supply  in base  period 
Base  period  PSE  =  shaded area 
Base  period  CSE  =  0 
Base  period  production distortion  =  0 
Base_~eriod consumption distortion =  0 
Base  period  trade distortion  =  0 
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ANNEX  B;  ILLUSTRATION  OF  PROPOSED  APPROACH  TO  CALCULATION  OF  AHS  REDUCTION 










o  A  c  s 
price  to  farmers 
price  to  farmers  which  would  be  necessary  to  induce  base  period 
production volume  in  the  absence  of  controls. 
world  market  equivalent  price 
Q =  controlled/managed  production  in base  period 
expec ted  produc tion. if  ... farmers  ... faced  ... world_prices . 
OB  =  expected  production if farmers -faced -supporte-<i-pr-ice  in· absence of . 
supply controls 
Base·~eriod AMS  = shaded  area =  Z  (=acdf) 
Base  period  trade distorting AMS  equivalent  =  Z«C-A)/(B-A» 
(  = abef when  supply curve linear) 
Let  agreed  depth of  cut  = X %,  and  x  =  X/100 
Then  AHS  reduction commitment  = xZ(C-A)/(B-A) 
Maximum  (target)  AMS  at end  of  transition period  =  Z -xZ  (C-A)/(B-A) 
14 Commentary 
The  above  diagram  can  be  taken  to  illustrate  the  situation in  two 
different  countries with  the  same  underlying  supply  response  function: 
Country  A pays  its farmers  price Pd,  but  also applies  controls  to 
limit  production  to ac. 
Country  B pays  its farmers  a  lower  price,  Pd*,  but  does  not  restrict 
output;  production  is also ac. 
Both  countries  distorfprbducti'on by  the  same- amount·(C~A),  which 
would  suggest  that  both should  be  required  to  reduce -their distortion by 
the  same  amount  under  a  "balanced  reduction of  trade effects" agreement. 
However,  the  t'''o  countries'  total AMS  levels are quite different,  - that  of 
Country A being  the area acdf  (shaded area  Z)  and  that of Country  B  the 
area abef.  Thus  an  equal  percentage  AMS  reduction would  require a 
considerably greater  pr6duCer\41r~ice reduction  in Country  A than  in Country 
B.  Vorse,  the  higher  price reduction  in Country  A,  would,  if less  than  (Pd 
- Pd*),  have  no  effect  on  production  in  that  country and,  thus,  may 
possibly  be  of  no  benefit  to  other countries and  world  trade.  Any  price 
decrease  in Country  B,  on  the  other hand,  would  result  in a  commensurate 
reduction  in production,  and  therefore also in  trade distortion,  in  that 
country. 
The  sensible solution to  this  paradox would  appear  to  be  to  require 
b'1th  countries  to  reduce  their production  to  the  same  degree.  This  could 
be  achjeved  by  requiring equal absolute reductions  in  their (different) 
total  AMS  levels  (equal,  in both cases,  to  X percent  of  the area abef 
above)  coupled  with  rules  to  ensure  that,  in  the  case of  Country A with 
production controls,  the  required  AMS  reductions  could. only  be  achieved  by 
means  which  would  reduce  trade distortions  (i.e.,  in  this  simple example, 
reductions  in production quota  rather  than  reductions  in  producer  prices; 
in  the  broader  c"ntext,  decreased  domestic  market  support  prices,  decreased 
exports,  increase  in  import  quotas,  etc.,  would  also  contribute  to  reduced 
trade distortions). 
15 SUPPLY  CONTROLS  IN  U.S.  AGRICULTURE 
Thomas  Y.  Hertel  and  Marinos  E.  Tsigas 
Many  different  forms  of  supply  control are employed  in U.S. 
agriculture.  These  include:  acreage controls,  output  quotas,  domestic 
marketing quotas,  and  various  types  of  marketing orders.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  the  international  trade  negotiations,  we  are  primarily  interested 
in  the effect which  such  measures  have  on:  (a)  exports,  and  (b)  productive 
capacity.  Export  levels are of  interest,  since  they  potentially influence 
world  prices.  The  impact  of  supply control measures  on  productive  capacity 
is also  important.  If output  is restricted ,"but  the  capacity  to  produce at 
higher levels  remains  in place,  then  these measures  will only  be  temporary 
in  their effect.  By  contrast,  controls which  simultaneously restrict 
supply and  encourage  resource adjustment  out  of agriculture are likely  to 
have  a  more  permanent  effect  on  output,  exports,  and  world  prices. 
Rather  than  go  through  an  exhaustive list of  programs  and  commodities, 
we  have  chosen  to  focus  on  the  major  program  crops--and examine  the 
implications  of alternative mechanisms  for  restricting their supply. 
Consider first  a  voluntary acreage  reduction  program  (nicknamed  a  "bid 
ARP").  Here,  we  assume  that  the  government  bids sufficient  food  grain, 
feed  grain,  oilseed,  and  cotton acreage  out  of  production in order  to  raise 
market  prices  by  10  percent.  (This  is not  unlike  the current Conservation 
Reserve  Program  except  that it is  n~t explicitly targeted  to 
environmentally sensitive acreage.)  The  first group  of  columns  in Table  1 
repo~t_ the medium  run  (4 year)  percentage changes  in output  and  exports  for 
each  of  the major  program  crop  categories.  Exports  always  fall by  a 
greater proportion  than output,  due  to  the  fact  that  export  demand  is more 
price responsive  than domestic  demand.  In  this  "bid ARP"  experiment, . 
planted acreage  falls  by  11  percent  and  medium  run yields  are higher  for 
all of  these  crops,  as  a  result  of  increasing  per  acre applications of 
nonland  inputs.  If one  measures  capacity as  the  productive  potential of 
resources  current  employed  plus  that  which  is  idled,  then  one  might  argue 
that,  by  promoting higher yield agriculture,  acreage  controls actually 
increase productive  capacity.  Of  course,  this  conclusion would  be  altered 
if idled  acreage  were  encouraged  to  move  into alternative uses.  However, 
in  most  rural areas  there are  few  alternative uses  which  can  compete 
successfully  (on  a  broad  scale)  with  commercial  agriculture. 
17 The  seconrl  group  of  columns  in Table  1  report  results  from  an 
experiment  whereby  tradeable output  quotas  are  issued,  on  the  basis  of 
historical production.  Once  again  these  measures  are designed  to  raise 
market  prices  by  10  percent  over  1984  levels.  Thus  the  requisite output 
and  export  reductions are quite close  to  those  in  the first  column. 
However,  the  impact  on  the  use  of variable inputs  and  yields  is 
dramatically different.  Now  nonland  input  use falls  rather  than rises.  In 
effect;  program  crop  production evolves  towards  a  lower  input  type  of 
agriculture.  [This differential effect of acreage  and  output  controls  on 
yields  has  been  observed historically in-the case of  the  tobacco  program. 
In  1986,  tobacco  allotments  switched  from  a  per-acre  to  a  per-pound  basis. 
Foster and  Babcock  show  that  this had  the  immediate effect of  lowering 
yields,  after which  point  they  proceeded  to  grow  at a  much  slower  annual 
rate  (0.8  percent/year vs.  3.8 percent/year).] 
Provided  output  quotas  are  tradeable,  they  result  in resources  leaving 
agriculture and  thus  serve  to  reduce  production capacity.  Of  course if 
quotas  are not  freely  traded,  for  example  if they are  tied  to  individual 
farms  or  producers,  then  they  may  actually exacerbate  the  problem  of excess 
capacity.  This  is because small producers  may  be  encouraged  to  remain  in 
production at  an  inefficient scale of  operation.  Empirical evidence 
indicates  that  the Canadian dairy program  has  had  this  type  of effect 
(Moschini) • 
. The  last experiment  in Table 1  illustrates  the  case of domestic 
marketing quotas.  This  is analogous  to  the  U.S.  peanut  program,  whereby 
domestic sales are restricted,  but  surplus  output  may  be  disposed of onto 
the world  market.  As  can  be  seen  from  the last columns  of Table 1,  this is 
a  far  less effective means  of  restricting output.  Furthermore,  exports 
actually increase  under  this  "supply  control"  regime.  The  validity of 
these results  is underlined  by  recent  experience with  the  peanut  program. 
After switching  from  output  to  domestic marketing quotas  under  the  1981 
Farm  Bill,  peanut  exports actually  increased  between  1982  and  1986.  This 
bucked  the  trend  for  other  farm  products  for  which  exports  were  falling 
dramatically over  this  same  period. 
18 In  sum,  the  method  chosen  for  implementation of  supply control  can 
make  a  big difference.  Tradeable outP\1t'quotas  tend  to  reduce  both exports 
and  productive  capacity  in agriculture.  Acreage  controls are effective in 
reducing exports,  but  do  less  to  encourage  a  decline  in capacity.  Domestic 
marketing quotas  actually have  the  potential for  increasing exports!  (This 
is hardly  the  type of supply control  measure  for  which  countries  should 
receive "credit"  in  the  GATT  negotiations.)  In  the  event  that  such credits 
are .to  be  assigned,  individual  measures  must  be  carefully evaluated  to 
assess  their  impact  on  exports  and  the  long  run  productive capacity of  the 
farm  sector.  It should also  be  borne" in mind  that  the  best  policy for 
reducing global surpluses will usually be  to -iittack  the  problem directly. 
This  may  involve  measures  such as  reducing subsidy levels or facilitating 
the adjustment  of resources  out  of  the  farm  sector. 
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Table  1.  Percentage  Changes  in Output  and  Exports  for  Major  Program  Crops  Under  AI~ernative Supply 
Cont~ol Measures,  Each  Designed  to  Raise  Domestic  Prices  by  10%  Over  1984  Levels.a, 
• 
Acreage'Controls  Ouq~ut Quotas  Domestic  Quotas 
Crop  Category  Output  Exports  Output  Exports  Output  Exports 
Foodgrains  -2.4%  - 4.8%  -2.4%  - 4.9%  -0.5%  -0.3% 
Oilseeds  -4.5  -11. 7  -4.6  -11.8  -0.2  +2.2 
Feedgrains  -5.7  -12.0  -5.9  -12.1  -3.0  +4.5 
Co t ton  -9.9  -29.0  -9.9  -29.2  -0.7  +0.4 
Source:  Hertel and  Tsigas. 
a  All  results  refer  to  a  medium-run  (4  year)  time  horizon. 
b  The  effect  of  these  measures  is simulated  in  the  presence of  those  programs  already  in  place  in 
1984.  (The  reason  for  picking  this historical period  is  that  complete  data  for  the current  year  are 
not  yet  available.  Furthermore,  current  program  expenditure levels are more  nearly  akin  to  pre-1985 
Farm  bill levels.)  However,  in order  to  retain  the market-oriented spirit.of the  1985  Farm  Bill,  we 
assume  in  this analysis  that  loan  rates are not  supporting world  market  prices.  All results  refer 
to  a  medium-run  (4  year)  time  horizon. " 
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21 THE  U.S.  VHEAT  PROGRAM 
Thomas  W.  Hertel  and  Marinos  E.  Tsigas 
The  U.S.  grains  programs  provide  a  complicated  puzzle  for  economists 
and  negotiators  interested in  trade liberalization.  On  the  one  hand,  set 
aside  requirements  reduce  planted acreage,  output  and  exports.  However, 
the  "bribe"  for voluntary idling of land  consists of deficiency payments, 
which  may  provide an  incentive for  increasing yields  on  that  acreage which 
is ultimately  planted,  perhaps  inducing  some  land  to  stay  in grain 
production  instead-of moving  into alternativauses.  The  relative strength 
of  these  compe ting effects varies  from  year  to 'year;  '.  However,  the  freezing 
of  program yields  under  the  1985  Farm  Bill has  undoubtedly reduced  the 
incentive effect associated with high  target prices.  The  purpose  of  this 
case  study  is  to  investigate  the  potential implications  of  this action. 
It is difficult  to  know  how  long it took  farmers  to grasp  the 
implications of  the  freeze  on  established yields.  This  feature was 
included late in  the debate over  the  1985  Farm  Bill,  which  wasn't  passed 
until December  of  1985--already part  way  through  the  1986  crop year  for 
wheat.  Since  program  yields  have  always  been  updated  in  the past,  many 
farmers  continued  to  report  these yields at  the  local ASCS  offices.  As  a 
result of  this uncertainty,  it is difficult  to  know  to what  degree  the 
change  in policy has  actually been  reflected  in producer decisions.  In any 
case,  the  reaction of  farmers 'was  urtd6"tibtedly  a:  delayed  one; , Calls  for  the 
repeal of  this provision have  only  recently been  heard 'on  Capitol Hill. 
In order  to  assess  the  implications of  freezing  program yields for 
wheat,  we  have  conducted  several simulation experiments with a  mathematical 
model  which  accounts  explicitly for  the heterogeneity of  the u.S.  wheat 
acreage  base.  This  work  is still in  progress,  however  preliminary results 
are reported  in  table  1.  They  refer  to  the  predicted  first year effect of 
permanently  freezing yields,  prior  to  a  given crop year.  They  assume  all 
farmers  recognize  that  current yields will not  be  reported  and  will  in no 
way  affect  future  payments.  Also,  total wheat  acreage  is assumed  unchanged 
by  the  freeze. 
In order  to  examine  the  sensitivity of  this  type  of  a  freeze  to 
different  program  conditions,  we  simulate  this  policy  in  two  different  crop 
23 years:  1982  and  1986.  The  first  represents  a  period of  relatively strong 
market  prices  and  modest  participation rates,  while  1986  was  a  year of much 
higher benefits and  hence  higher participation rates. 
The  first effect  of  the  freeze  on  yields  is  to  reduce  optimal variable 
input  levels  of  program  participants,  since  they  no  longer  consider  the 
target  price  in making  such decisions.  This  drop  is particularly dramatic 
(-22.7  percent)  in 1986  when  the  target  price was  far  in excess  of market 
prices  for  wheat.  As  a  consequence,  realized yields  fall.  These  may  ~ven 
fall  below  established yield levels.  Thus  if it was  desirable  to  be  in  the 
program  before,  it will still be  attractive afterwards,  provided  there is 
no  change  in  the  market  price of wheat. 
Of  course,  one  consequence of  reduced yields  is  lower  output  and  hence 
lower  export  levels.  We  estimate  that  1986  output  would  have  been  11.2 
percent  lower  in  the  presence  of  a  preannounced,  permanent  freeze  on 
program yields  (table 1,  column  1).  Lower  wheat  output  raises market 
prices and  induces  some  farms  to  leave  the  program.  We  project  that 
participating acres  fall  by  5.9 percent  or about  3.9 million acres.  A 
secondary effect of  this  lower  program  participation rate is  to slightly 
increase planted acreage  (by  1.1 million acres).  This  moderates  the 
decline in total and  variable  inputs which  fall  by  21.4  percent. 
Perh~ps the  mos.t  interesting. consequence .of.the, freeze  on  program 
yields is  the subsequent  rise in land  rents.,·  With-inelastic shortrun.,farm"" 
level demand,  the  market  price of wheat  rises more  than output  falls.  Thus 
receipts  from  the  marketplace rise.  Deficiency  payments  are paid as  the 
product  of  the  frozen  program yields  and  program  acreage  (which  declines 
only slightly).  They  f~ll primarly due  to  the rise in market  prices. 
However,  total  farm  receipts  rise,  while variable  input  expenditures  fall. 
Thus  returns  to  the  residual claimant  on  income--land--must  rise.  The 
magnitude  of  this effect  is negatively correlated with  the  change  in  land-
substituting nonland  inputs.  Thus  it is strongest  in  1986,  when  land  rents 
rise by  almost  16  percent. 
The  next  column  of  table  1  reports  the  effects of  a  permanent  freeze 
on  program  yields  prior  to  the  1982  crop  year.  In 1982,  the gap  between 
the  target  and  market  prices  was  relatively modest,  as  was  the level of 
24 participation in  the vheat  program.  As  a  result,  the  impact  of  the yield 
freeze  or  the  rate of nonland  input  use  is also  small,  although  there is 
still a  significant effect  on  program  participation. 
The  results  in  table  1  reflect  the shortrun  (one year)  responses  to  a 
freeze  on  program yields.  In  the  longer  run  several additional dimensions 
come  into play.  First of all,  as  technological  process  raises yields,  ve 
can expect  the  frozen  program yields  to  fall  farther  and  farther  behind. 
This viII tend  to  discourage participation.  Yorking  in  the opposite 
direction is  the  fact  that  the  long run export .demand  elasticity is 
considerably larger  than its one  yearcounterpart~'This viII moderate  the 
long  run  market  price increase folloving  the  reduction  in u.s.  vheat 
output.  Since  this vas  the factor  leading  to  a  short  run decline in 
participation,  it  too viII be  moderated.  Finally,  there is the question of 
vheat  acreage  response.  Over  time,  higher  land  rents viII  tend  to  drav 
additional acreage  into vheat  production,  provided  returns  to alternative 
cropping activities are unchanged.  This viII  tend  to moderate  the  long  run 
decline  in vheat  output. 
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Table 1.  ShortRun  Implications of a  Permanent  Freeze*  in Program  Yields 
for  U.S.  Wheat  (Percentage  Change  in Selected Variables) 
Variable  Year  of  Freeze 
1986  1982 
Variable Inputs 
-per planted acre  -22.7%  -1.5 
-total applications  -21.4  -1.2 
Output  -11.2  -0.4 
Exports  -16.9  -0.6 
Participating Acres  - 5.9  -4.8 
Average  Annual  Return  to  land  +15.9  +0.9 
*These  are  preliminary  results.  Final estimates will be  available  from  the 
authors  in January,  1990. 
26 INCORPORATING  THE  EXPORT  ENHANCEMENT  PROGRAM  IN  THE  PSE 
Nicole Ballenger and  Stephanie Mercier 
This  paper  looks  at  the  incorporation of  the  U.S.  export  enhancement 
program  (EEP)  in  the  U.S.  producer  subsidy equivalent  (PSE).  It shows  how 
the  EEP  component  of  the  PSE  relates  to  other  PSE  components,  thereby 
making  it difficult  to  directly assess  the EEP's  contribution  to  total 
producer support.  This  lack of  policy  independence  complicates  the  issue of 
how  to  credit  (or debit)  the  United  States  for  changes  in EEP  policy.  The 
pape~ also  looks  at  the  EEP  in  the  context  of  a  fixed .reference price PSE. 
Since  the  EEP  does  not  have  fixed ·parameters,·suchas a  known  subsidy rate, 
and  would  be  expected  to  vary with  the  reference  price,  some  rule must  be 
assumed  for  calculating  the  EEP  component  of  a  fixed  reference price PSE. 
The  Export  Enhancement  Program 
The  EEP  was  introduced  in  the  spring of  1985  for  the  purpose  of 
expanding  U.S.  exports,  particularly by  countering export subsidies  of 
competing suppliers.  Under  the  program,  bonuses  in the  form  of generic 
certificates exchangeable  for  commodities  held  in CCC  inventory are awarded 
to exporters  who  win  USDA  approval  to  make  sales  in  targeted markets  at 
discounted  prices.  The  EEP  has  been  used  most  widely  for  wheat  (where 
competition  from  the  EC  has  been  fierce),  but  has  also  covered barley, 
poultry and  eggs,  rice,  vegetable 011,  alldseveralother commodities. 
Bonuses--the official name  for  EEP  subsidies--have varied considerably 
since <the  EEP  began.  For  example,  in  the  case of wheat,  bonuses  per  ton 
sold  under  the program  averaged  $27  in 1985/86  (or  21  percent of  the  U.S. 
FOB  Gulf  export  price),  $37  in 1986/87  (34  percent  of  the export  price), 
$34  in 1987/88  (28  percent of  the  export  price),  and  $19  (or  12  percent  of 
the  export  price)  through  March  of  the  1988/89  marketing year  (USDA).  The 
average  monthly  EEP  bonus  has  ranged  from  a  high  of  $45  per  ton  in October 
1985  to  a  low  of  $14  per  ton  in November  1988  (USDA).  Bonuses  vary  by 
country  and  have  generally  been  higher  for  the  more  contested  markets  and 
lower  for  those where  the  EC  has  been  less  competitive  (USDA). 
Recent  criticism of  the  EEP  has  prompted  the  Administration  to  narrow 
the  objectives  of  the  program,  focusing  on  its ability  to  pressure  the  EC 
27 toward  policy  reform  by  raising the Community's  budget  for  export 
restitutions and  challenging its market  presence.  Consequently,  EEP 
decision makers  will  be  responsive  to  changing  market  conditions, 
particularly as  influenced  by  the EC,.in  choosing  country and  commodity 
targets,  as  well  as  EEP  prices  and  bonus  levels.  This  makes  the  EEP  very 
different  than  an  export  subsidy  fixed  in either ad  valorem or dollar 
units,  and  poses  a  challenge  to analyzing  the  EEP  component  of  an  aggregate 
measure  of  support.  The  EEP  is also different  than  policies designed  to 
maintain prices or  income  at  some  specific level. 
Measuring  the  producer subsidy· equivalent· otthe EEP. 
The  EEP  is incorporated in  the U.S.  PSE's  in a  simple,  straightforward 
fashion,  abstracting  from  the effect of stocks  released  as  bonuses.  After 
each  crop year  the  ex  post  export  subsidy  rate is calculated by  dividing 
total EEP  bonuses  for  the  particular commodity  by  the  total exports  of  that 
commodity.  This  per unit subsidy  rate  (for example,  $26  per  ton  for  wheat 
in  1987)  is  then multiplied  by  total production  in order  to derive  the 
total value  of  transfers  to  producers  associated with  the  EEP.  This 
approach  takes  a  backward  look at  the EEP,  making  it appear  no  different 
than  the provision of  support  through  a  uniform  subsidy on  every unit 
exported.  Figure  1  gives  a  graphical representation of  the  EEP  component 
of  the  PSE. 
Figure  1  helps  make  two  important  points.  First·,  the  EEP  affects 
other  programs  measured  in  the  PSE  through its effect on  the market  price. 
As  the  figure  indicates,  if the  EEP  were  eliminated,  domestic  market  prices 
would  be  likely  to fall.  This  would  increase  the  taxpayer  contribution  to 
the  PSE  in  the  form  of higher deficiency payments  (assuming unchanged 
target  prices and  that deficiency payments  were  basen  on  the market  price 
rather  than  the  loan  rate).  Storage payments  and  loan  forfeitures  would 
also  be  affected--and would  probably  increase with  the  EEP's  elimination-
-because  these  components  are also affected  by  market  prices.  Thus,  the 
EEP  does  not  operate  independently  from  other U.S.  programs  and  changing 
the  EEP  will  change  these other  PSE  components.  This  makes  it difficult  to 
say  precisely what  the  value  of  the  U.S.  PSE's  would  be  without  the  EEP, 
but 
suggests  that  the  total  PSE  would  be  reduced  by  less  than  the  EEP 
component. 
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Second,  the  figure  shows  the  relationship  between  the  EEP  subsidy,  the 
producer  price,  and  the  reference price.  In  the  calculation procedure,  the 
ex  post  EEP  subsidy  rate and  the  observed  producer  price  (which is a 
function  of  the  EEP  and  other variables)  are  used  to  derive  the  the 
reference price  (which  is not  actually observed).  Suppose  the  reference 
price was  predetermined  (in order  to  remove  the effects of unstable 
reference prices  on  PSE's).  In  this  case,  because  the  EEP  has  no  fixed 
parameters,  either  the subsidy  rate or  the  producer  price would  have  to  be 
assumed  in order  to  derive  the  new  EEP  component.  If the  producer  price is 
assumed  unchanged--such  that  the  EEP  component  relies on  the  difference 
between  the  observed  producer price and  the  fixed  reference price--the 
underlying assumption  is  that  the  EEP  subsidy  is set so as  to  maintain 
producer prices unchanged  (like  the variable levy/export  subsidy system 
used  by  the  EC).  If  the S/ton EEP  subsidy  rate is assumed  unchanged--such 
that  the  new  producer  price is determined  by  the  reference price plus  the 
subsidy--the underlying assumption is  that  the  EEP  program is unresponsive 
to  price  changes  in  the  overseas  markets  and  maintains  a  constant  margin 
between  U.S.  producer  and  export  prices.  Some  rule would  have  to  be 
devised  in order  to  translate reference price changes  into changes  in EEP 
subsidy levels. 
Changes  in  PSE's  due  to  the  Export  Enhancement  Program 
The  EEP  was  first  incorporated in  the U.S.  PSEt s  with' the 1985  or 1986 
calculations,  depending  on  when  the  commodity  was  first sold under  the 
auspices  of  the  program.  Currently,  barley,  poultry,  rice,  and  wheat  PSEts 
contain EEP  components.  Yithout  taking into account  policy interactions, 
the  EEP  component's  contribution  to  the  PSE  varies markedly  by  commodity 
and  year.  Although  wheat  accounts  for  by  far  the largest share of  EEP 
shipments,  as  a  contributor  to  the  PSE  the  EEP  was  more  important  to  some 
other  commodities.  For  barley,  the  EEP  component  represented  about  50 
percent  of  the  total  transfers  to  producers  in  1986  and  1987;  for  poultry 
the  EEP  accounted  for  somewhat  under  50  percent  of  the  transfers  in  1986 
and  more  than  50  percent  in  1987;  for  rice,  support  through  the  EEP  has 
been  negligible;  for  wheat,  the  EEP  contributed 7  percent  of  transfers  in 
1985,  10  percent  in  1986,  and  25  percent  in 1987  (Nelson). 
30 The  EEP  component  of  the  PSE's  generally grew  from  1985  to  1986  anu 
again  hetween  1986  and  1987  as  more  government  funds  were  allocated  to  the 
program  and  the  total value  of  commodity  bonuses  grew  accordingly.  For 
example,  EEP  bonuses  for  wheat  rose  from  5271.6  million in  1985  to  $1453.4 
million  in 1987,  a  435  percent  increase over  that  period.  However,  it 
should  be  noted  that  for  the  program  commodities  (barley,  rice,  and  wheat), 
producer  income  is little, if at all,  affected  by  the  EEP  even  if the EEP 
is  a  significant  component  of  the  PSE.  For  these  commodities,  producer 
income  is maintained  with  the  target  price,  particularly when  farm  program 
participation is as  high  as it was  during  these ,years.  Nonetheless,  the 
direct effect of  the  EEP  on  the  PSE  is  to"raise·transfers  by  driving a 
wedge  between  domestic  market  prices and  export  (or  reference)  prices.  The 
indirect effect,  as  illustrated above,  is  to shift some  of  the source of 
producer  support  from  taxpayers  to  consumers  as  domestic  prices are raised 
above  export  prices. 
Changes  in  the  PSE's  have  a  variety of underlying causes.  Between 
1985  and  1986,  the U.S.  wheat  PSE  increased  from  38.6  to  61.2  (figure 2). 
Much  of  this  period's  increase was  due  to  a  13.7  percent decline in wheat 
production.  In fact,  changing output  alone  between  1985-86  would  have 
caused  the  PSE  to  jump  to  50.3,  accounting  for  52  percent  of  the shift. 
Changing  other  types  of government  payments  (excluding EEP)  accounted  for 
34  percent  of  the  change,  leaving only 14  percent  to  be  accounted  for  by 
the  increase in EEP  'spendin'g  levels" (figure '3) },., ,"  ,.  " 
Between  1986  and  1987,  the U.S.  wheat  PSE  rose  from  61.2 't'o  63.3' 
percent  (figure 2).  Decomposition of  this shift reveals  a  very different 
picture  from  1985-86.  Over  this second  period,  wheat  output  increased just 
under  1  percent,  which  alone  would  have  decreased  the  PSE  to 58.4 percent. 
Similarly,  other  transfers  to wheat  producers  (except  EEP)  decreased,  which 
would  have  decreased  the  PSE  further,  to  53.5  percent.  The  large  increase 
in EEP  transfers offset  the declines  that  would  have  occurred  in  the  PSE 
due  to  the other factors,  and  increased  the  PSE  slightly instead.  As 
suggested  above,  the  increase  in EEP  probably  contributed  to  a  decrease  in 
2.This  analysis  of  the  sources  of  change  in  the  PSEs  is purely static in 
that  it does  not  take  into  account  how  changes  in  the  EEP  might  have 
caused  changes  in  the  other  PSE  components. 
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Figure  2.  Changes  in  Selected 
U.S.  PSE's,  1985-87 
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Figure  3. Decomposition  of  Changes 
in  Selected U.S.  PSE's,  Year  by  Year 
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_  Output  . ~  Other Programs  ffim EEP Funding transfers  through  some  other sources,  such as deficiency  payments,  loan 
forfeitures,  and  storage  payments. 
The  EEP  and  Measures  of  Producer  Support  Using  Fixed  Reference Prices 
The  PSE  used  in  the  above  discussion allows  the  reference price  to 
differ  from  year  to year.  Some  participants  in  the  Uruguay  Round  maintain 
that  use of  a  world  reference price  that varies annually  in  the  support 
measure  could  reflect  changes  in  exchange  rates  and  other prices  that are 
not  the  result of agricultural policy decisions.  The  EC,  for  example,  has 
proposed an  aggregate  measure ·of  support.with.a fixed  reference price 
called  the subsidy measurement  unit  (SMU). 
Table  1  shows  the  changes  in  the market  value of  output  (value of 
output = output  times  producer  price = output  times  reference price  plus 
total EEP  bonuses)  and  the  PSE  resulting from  assigning a  fixed  reference 
price and  using  three alternative rules  for  determining  the  PSE  component. 
Two  fixed  price scenarios are considered:  1)  a  high  fixed  reference price 
(HFRP),  in which  the world  reference price  from  1985  ($107.61/ton)  is used 
for  both  1986  and  1987  PSE's,  and  2)  a  low  fixed  reference price  (LFRP),  in 
which  the world  reference price  from  1987  ($70.49/ton)  is used  for  1985  and 
1986  PSE's. 
Using  the lowreferencerprice;and  assum4ng.·~thaL total.  EEP  .. ,bonuses  (or 
the subsidy per  ton  of exports)  and  all other government"spending  remain· 
unchanged  (Rule 1),  the  PSE  increases  over  the original estimate.  This 
resulr follows  from  the  fact  that  the numerator of  the  PSE  (the value of 
policy  transfers)  remains,  by  assumption,  unchanged  while  the value of  the 
denominator  (market  earnings  plus direct  payments)  falls  along with  the 
reference price.  The  high  reference price generates  the  opposite effect. 
However,  given  the nature of  the EEP,  fixing  a  reference price and 
leaving EEP  bonuses  unchanged  generates  a  PSE  figure  that  is not 
particularly meaningful.  As  discussed above,  EEP  bonuses  vary  by 
transaction,  instead  of  being  fixed  by  law.  EEP  expenditures  would  be 
likely  to  vary with world  prices  movements  because  the  program  is designed 
to  keep  U.S.  exports  competitive  in world  agricultural markets.  Figure  4 
34 Table 1.- Wheat PSE's  using Different World Reference  Prices 
Reference  Value of 
Year  Price  Output 
$/ton  $mill. 
1985  107.61  7374.2 
1985  70.49  4924.7 
1985  70.49  5018.4 
1985  70.49  7374.2 
1986  78.63  5044.3 
1986  107.61  6693.8 
1986  107.61  6483.6 
1986  107.61  50443 
1986  70.49  4581.1 
1986  70.49  4639.8 
1986  70.49  50443 
1987  70.49  5496.8 
1987  107.61  7625.5 
1987  107.61  , ..  6855.2··" 
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EEP  decision rule 
original PSE 
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HFRP/Rule No.2, 37%b 
HFRP/Rule No.3, $88c 
LFRP /Rule No.  r 
LFRP /Rule No.2, 10%b 
LFRP /Rule No.3, $88c 
original PSE 
HFRP  /Rule No.1-
.- ·HFRP/Rule No. "2,  53%b 
HFRP  /Rule -No.' 3;  $95C::" 
Note: - HFRP, J..FRP  = high, low fixed reference prices.  The high price is  from 
1985, and the low price is from 1987.  Deficiency payments and spending on other 
government programs are assumed unchanged. 
- Rule No.1 assumes no change in EEP funding (or bonuses) when reference 
price is changed.  ' 
b Rule No. 2 assumes EEP funding is changed the same percentage that the 
reference price changes, but in the opposite direction.  Percentage shown is 
proportion by which EEP funding changes. 
C  Rule No.3 assumes that EEP  bonuses are set so as  to maintain the producer 
price actually observed in the year under consideration. Dollar amount shown is 
the producer price for  that year. 
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FIGUFE  4 :  U. S.  EXPORT  PRICE  AND  EEP  BONUS  , 
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...  ·I;~'Jl1 opposite direction of u.s.  export  prices--as export  prices have  risen, 
bonuses  have  fallen.  Thus,  a  second  rule for  incorporating  the  EEP  in a 
fixed  reference  price  PSE  would  allow  changes  in  EEP  bonuses  to offset 
world  price  changes.  For  example,  if the  fixed  reference price approach 
dictated a  20  percent  decline  in  reference prices,  then  EEP  bonuses  would 
be  increased  by  20  percent.  Not  surprisingly,  offsetting the decline  in 
reference prices with  increased  EEP  subsidies  (Rule  2)  raises  the  PSE 
somewhat  above  that generated with  fixed  EEP  subsidies.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  EEP  subsidies  are  adjusted  downward  in  response  to  the higher 
reference price,  the  PSE  falls  by  more  than it does  in  the  fixed  EEP 
subsidy case. 
A third decision  rule would  assume  that  the  EEP  is used  to achieve 
some  targeted level of producer  returns  from  the market.  This  rule would 
involve  taking  the  fixed  reference  price and  adding an  EEP  subsidy until 
the  sum  reached  the  designated  producer  price.  A high  fixed  reference 
price would  reduce  EEP  expenditures  below  actual levels,  while  a  low  fixed 
reference price would  increase  them.  This  approach would  yield  the highest 
revised  PSE's  for  low  reference price scenarios  and  the  lowest  revised 
PSE's  for  the high  reference price scenarios. 
A fourth  possible decision rule would  be  one  often enunciated  by  u.s. 
policymakers  (that is,  that  the  EEP  is used  to  counteract  the effects of 
unfair  foreigncompe ti  don)'~  . Th'is"''fule'''would-'''fO'cus' o'n'the EC  and  its 
extensive use of export  restitution payments,  and  on  the  EEP  subs'idy 
nece~s~ry to  match  the  EC  export  price.  In fact,  many  EEP  wheat  sales are 
made  in markets  which  also  import  EC  soft wheat,  such as  countries  in 
Northern Africa.  The  appeal of  this decision rule  is seen in figure  5 
which  illustrates  the close relationship between  the  trends  in  the  U.S.-EC 
wheat  price differential and  the  EEP  bonus.  Nonetheless,  the U.S.  has 
offered  EEP  bonuses  in a  number  of markets  where  the  EC  is not  a  ma10r 
competitor,  so  the  characterization of  this decision  rule would  not  explain 
the  entire workings  of  the  EEP  to  date at least.  In order  to  implement 
this rule,  the  EEP  component  of  the  PSE  might  be  adjusted  in order  to 
reflect  the  change  in  the  U.S.-Ee  price differential as  indicated  by  the 
relative adjustments  in  their  respective  reference  prices. 
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I  I  I  I Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  contribution of  the  EEP  to  the u.s.  PSE's  varies  by  year  and 
commodity,  but  generally  increased during  the  period  we  considered.  For 
program  commodities,  the  EEP  affects other  PSE  components,  such as 
deficiency  and  storage  payments,  making  it difficult  to  assess  precisely 
both  the direct and  indirect effects of  the  EEP  on  total  transfers  to 
producers.  Simple  graphical analysis suggests  that if the  EEP  were 
eliminated  the  PSE  would  fall but  not  by  as  much  as  the  EEP  component  of 
the  PSE. 
The  paper also makes  the  point  that if a  fixed  reference price is used 
an  EEP  decision rule must  be  devised  in order  to  assess  the contribution of 
the  EEP  to  the  PSE.  In our  examples  using  the wheat  PSE,  three alternative 
decision rules yield different  PSE's  when  other  PSE  components  (eg., 
spending  on  deficiency  payments)  are  assumed  to  remain  fixed.  Decision 
rule 3--that  the  EEP  component  consists of  the difference  between  the  fixed 
reference  price and  the  observed  producer  price--yields  the  highest  PSE  in 
the  low  reference  price case and  the  lowest  PSE  in  the  high reference  price 
case.  If,  for  program  commodities,  other  PSE  components  changed  in order 
to  compensate  for  changes  in  the  EEP  (for example,  if deficiency  payments 
increased if  the  reference price and  market  value of  output  fell),  then  the 
EEP  decision rule would  matter" less -in  de'termin'ing"the--tot-al"PSE."  This 
point  is illustrated in Appendix  A where  the  three decision rules are 
applied under,  first,  the  assumption  that deficiency  payments  are  fixed 
-
and,  second,  the  assumption  that deficiency  payments  vary  to  make  up  the 
difference  between  a  fixed  target  price and  a  variable producer  price. 
Nonetheless,  even with  this alternative assumption  the  EEP  decision rule 
used  determines  the  EEP's  importance  in  the  revised  PSE. 
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40 APPENDIXA 
Original PSE (approximation and simplification) 
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PSE' (DP based on Pt-PP')* 
= (Pt-PP') + EEP'  = 3 
Pt  4 
*  Assumes PP' above loan rate. 
41 Rule 2:  EEP"changed by same percent as reference price, 






4  PSE'(DP fixed) 
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PSE'(DP fixed= Pt-PP-Pt-PP') 
=  DP+EEP'"'"~  3" 
EEP'  DP+PP  4 
Note:  EEP' could bump against spending limits. 
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PSE,  DECOUPLED  PSE  AND  CREDIT  FOR  SUPPLY  MANAGEMENT  POLICIES 
(application  to  the  EC  Dairy  Quota  Scheme) 
Louis  P.  Mahe  and  Herve  Guyomard 
The  paper  proposes  an  approach  to  measure  the  credit/debit  for  policy 
actions,  in  the  context  of  supply management  policies. 
The  framework  is  based  on  a  decomposition  of  the  total PSE  into a. 
"Decoupled  PSE"  which  is a  non-distorting  income  transfer and  a  "Supply 
Inducing Equivalent"  (SIE),which is, the·pa~t·ofincome transfer which  is 
responsible  for  supply  increase above  free  trade levels.  The  key  element 
of  decomposition  is  the level of  the  shadow  price of  the quota and  the 
quasi-rent,  i.e.  the difference between  the market  price and  the  shadow 
price associated with  the quota. 
The  method  can  be  extended  to  the whole  farm  sector,  and  includes 
cross effects  between  outputs  and  inputs.  It can  also  be  applied  to 
situations where  some  factors  are  rationed  (set aside,  fertilizer 
quota, ...  ).  It leads  to  a  measure  of  AMS  which  can also  be  decomposed  into 
a  "Decoupled  AMS"  (DAMS)  and  a  "Supply  Inducing  AMS"  (SlAMS). 
A preliminary application  to  policy adjustments  made  by  the  EC 
(including  the dairy quota)  since 1986  leads  to  an  estimate of  the  credit  -
which  is a  change  in  SIE  - for  the dairy quota at 5.39 billion ECU  (1986). 
Vhen  other commodi ties· under  the··CAP.  regime ,are  included  .. in. the analysis, 
the decrease  in  the  dairy shadow  price is estimated at'21 percent  in real, 
terms  and  the  total credit  that  the  EC  could  claim amounts  to over  9 
billio'n ECU  of which  4.8 billion ECU  is due  to  the quota on  milk and  1.5 
billion ECU  is due  to  higher world  prices. 
Introduction 
In spring 1989  contracting paFties  of  the  GATT  agreed  to  give credit 
to  countries  for  policy adjustments  made  from  1986  to  1988  in  the direction 
of  lower  support  of  their agriculture.  As  policy  instruments  vary  a  lot 
among  commodities  and  countries,  and  as  world  markets  have  been  shaken  by 
climatic conditions,  the  assessment  of  the  credit  to  be  granted  for  policy 
changes  is a  real challenge. 
43 Table 0 
Table  O.  Estilate  of  credit  for  EC  policy  action,  1986  to  1988 
(Sullary  table  of  results,  lulticolloditycase) 
Dairy  Support  World  price  Total 
quota  price  cut  effect  credit 
(lillian  ECU,  1986) 
Dairy  quota  4 844  860  5 704 
other  outputs 
• grains  2 850  350  3 200 
• oilseeds  1 172  27  1 199 
• beef  136  292  428 
inputs 
• grains  -1  462  -1  462 
• proteins 
Total  contribution  4 844  2 696  1 529  9069 
44 This  paper gives  an  approach  for  the  case of  supply  management 
policies where  policy  instruments  are  both quantities  and  prices  rather 
than  prices  only.  The  familiar  notion  of  PSE  cannot  be  used  in a 
straightforward way  in  that  case.  Under  a  production  quota  the  income 
transfer  can  be  measured  as  the  sum  of  a  decoupled  transfer and  a  supply 
distorting  transfer.  The  former,  later called Decoupled  PSE  (DPSE), 
corresponds  to  the quasi  rent,  and  the latter corresponds  to  the wedge 
between  the  shadow  price associated with  the  quota and  the  "Vorld"  price. 
This  part,  later called  Supply  Inducing Equivalent  (SIE),  is  the  income 
transfer,  i.e.  the  amount  of  PSE  which  would  have  been just sufficient  to 
raise production  from  the  free  trade level.to.the.leyel of  the quota. 
Using  the  shadow  price,  a  very simple  formula  can  be  used  to  calculate  the 
modified  PSEs  and  the  credit  to  be  granted  for  policy changes. 
Section 1  deals  with the single commodity  case and  takes  a  rather 
casual approach  to  the  tre3tment  of credit/debit  in  the  context  of  a 
production quota.  This  approach  is in line with  the widespread  empirical 
calculation of  the  PSEs,  although neither  the  underlying  technology,  nor 
the  relation with producer's  surplus are really made  clear.  In section 2 
we  present  a  more  rigorous  framework  using a  profit  function approach.  In 
section  3  we  discuss  problems  of  implementation  and  the large country case. 
1.  The  Single  Commodity- Small  Country  Case  (PSE,  DPSE,  SIE) 
The  PSE  on  one  commodity  is in general calculated according- to' the-
formula: 
·P"SE  = yO  (pO  _  pO  )  +  ISo  (1) 
w 
where  yO  is production;  pO  and  pOw'  respectively supported  and  world 
prices;  ISo,  input  subsidies which  can  be  specific or allocated  to  the 
particular commodity.  Part  of  (pO_pO)  may  correspond  to  budget 
w 
expenditures  depending  on  policy  instruments  used  to  provide  price support. 
Vhen  the  commodity  under  consideration is subject  to  a  production 
quota which  is binding at  the  level yO,  a  distinction should  be  made 
between  a  Decoupled  PSE  (DPSE)  and  a  Supply  Inducing  PSE  (SIE,  Supply 
Inducing Equivalent).  The  former  transfer  does  not  enhance  the  production, 
it is  the quasi  rent  associated with  the  quota.  The  latter is  the  part of 
the  PSE  which  is  required  to  induce  production just at  level yO  without  the 
45 quota  implemented.  The  variation of  SIE  is directly related  to  the notion 
of· debit/credit  in which  we  are  interested. 
As  illustrated on  the classical figure  1  the  quota  is  binding if 
yO  < S  [pO,  pl,  K]  (2) 
1  where  S(.)  is  the  supply  function  of  yO,  p  a  vector  of  variable  input 
prices,  and  K a  vector of  fixed  factors. 
- There  is a  virtual price level  ~o which  would  exactly bring  the 
production level at yO, 
1  yO  = S  [~O,  P  ,  KJ 
1  Solving  (3)  for  ~o defines  ~o as  a  function  of  p  ,  K and  yO,  and  of 
1  input  subsidies  ISo  in as  much  as  they  influence  p  • 
°  (0  1  K)  ~  = g  y, p  , 
(3) 
(4) 
Yith  these  familiar definitions,  it is possible  to  decompose  the  PSE 
which  is  the  total  transfer  into  the  DPSE  which  is only a  domestic matter 
and  the  SIE  which  affects output  and  therefore  trade.  The  DPSE  is defined 
by  the  following  equation. 
(5) 
This  is also  the quasi-rent due  to  the quota.  Although  proportional  to  the 
level of production,  it does  not  induce  any  output  increase.3 
It is not  the  same  for  the  component  of  the  PSE  which  is the gap 
between  the  shadow  price  ~o and  the world price po  :  w 
SIE  = yO  (~O_pO  )  +  ISo  (6)  w 
As  can  be  seen on  figure  1,  the  SIE  is  the  income  transfer which,  in  the 
absence of a  quota restraint,  would  have  increased  production  from  free 
trade up  to  yO. 
3.At  least in a  rather static point  of  view,  the  DPSE  has  no  effect  on  the 
level of  production.  Nevertheless,  as  it affects  income,  it may 
eventually affect  the  output  of  resources  from  the  farm  sector and 
therefore  production  capacity.  The  label "Decoupled"  given  to  the quasi-
rent  is also  somewhat  too  strong in as  much  as  the  producer  does  have  to 
produce  yO  to  receive  the quasi-rent. 
46 Figure 1 
Fiqure  1 - Decolposition  of  the  PSE  in  the  Decoupled  Subsidy  Equinlent  (DPSE)  and  the  Supply  Inducinq 
Equivalent  (SIB),  in  the  presence  of  a production  quota. 
- - -' - - - - - -
DPSE 
.  I 
late  :  In  the  presence  of  ;roduction  quotas  only  one  part  of  the  PSE,  i.e.  y'  (p'  - P',)  where  p'  is  the 
shadol  price  corresponding  to  the  level  of  the  quota  has  an  effect  on  production, 
47 It is clear  from  (1),  (5)  and  (6)  that: 
PSE  = DPSE  +  SIE  (7) 
The  estimate of  the credit  to  be  granted  for  policy action clearly 
depends  on  the  interpretation of  the  notion of credit/debit.  As  the  debate 
on  PSE  as  opposed  to  TOE  has  shown,  the  PSE  is an  income  concept  which  is 
equivalent  to  the  amount  of  transfer which  induces  the  same  supply level, 
only  under  special cases  where  prices,  taxes,  subsidies,  tariffs are  policy 
instruments.  From  the  point  of view  of agricultural trade relations,  the 
real issue is  the  impact  of policies on  output,  utilization and  trade. 
This  perspective leads  to  correct  the  PSE  in  the  case where  supply  control 
measures  are  implemented.  The  evaluation of credit/debit  for  policy 
changes  should  therefore  emphasize  the  SIE  part of  the  PSE  rather  than  the 
whole  transfer.  It is clear,  as  a  simple  case,  that cutting po  down  to  pO* 
on  figure  1  will have  no  effect on  production,  and  therefore on  trade. 
a)  Definition of  the debit/credit  (small  country  case  dpo  = 0) 
w 
The  credit/debit  can  be  measured  by  the variation of  the  SIE  due  to 
changes  in  the level of  policy instruments,  which  are supposed here  to  be 
po,  yO,  and/or  input subsidies. 
The  credit  to  be  granted  for effective cuts  in price support  can  be 
defined as  a  negative variation of  the  SIE;  a  debit  being an  increase in 
the effective support  SIE.  A general definition of credit due  to  changes_ .. 
dyo,  dISo,  dpo  can  be  defined as  follows: 
Debi~ = - Credit  = d  (SIE) 
(8) 
The  important  variable in  the determination of  duo  will be  examined 
below.  Clearly,  if the  shadow  price  increases  as  a  result of  policy 
changes  the  first  term  is positive.  That  would  be  the  case if the  supply 
function  for  yO  shifts  to  the left as  a  result of  a  cost  increase or a  cut 
in subsidies.  As  can  be  seen  from  figure  1 also,  an  increase  in  the  level 
of  the  quota  would  increase uO.  The  algebraic  sum  of  the  three  terms  in 
(8)  which  mayor  may  not  offset  each  other,  determines  the eventual sign of 
the debit/credit. 
48 b)  Graphical  illustration of  credit/debit  for selected policy changes 
bl.  An  isolated  reduction  in  the  level of  the  quota 
In  that  case  the  evaluation of  the debit  according  to  equation  (8), 
letting d(ISO)  = 0,  gives: 
Debit  =  yO  d~o +  (~O - pOw)  dyo 
where  d~o =  (a~o/~O)dyO is calculated along  the  supply  curve given  by  (3). 
In  the  case of  a  reduction dyo  of  the  level of  allowed  quota  (by  dyO), 
the  shadow  price falls  by  d~o and  the  PSE  will decrease  by  area  (b  +  c), 
which  is an  approximation of the  income effect.  But  the  equivalent  income 
effect which  would  have  produced  the  same  supply  reduction is given  by  area 
- (a+c).  It is clear  that  the  component  a  is just shifted  from  the  SIE  to 
the  DPSE  and  is not  inducing  supply  any  more.  Area  a  should  be  considered 
as  the  appropriate measure  of  the  credit obtained  from  quantity 
restriction.  Area  (a  +  c)  could also  be  used  to  follow  the  more 
traditional calculation of  PSE. 
Note  that  the  presence  of area c  under  the supply  curve,  which 
represents  the  cost  saved  when  output  is  reduced,  is an artifact of  the 
practical implementation of  PSE  calculations.  If the producer's surplus 
rather  than  the  PSE  was  used,  area c  would  not  be  included  in d(PSE)  nor  in 
d(SIE).  In section 2,  where  a  more  rigorous approach  is used  in  the 
evaluation of  AMS,  the  contribution"of·,the  good"under~ quota, to, the 
aggregate credit will only  be- area a  (when  only  the quota level is 
al  tered). 
b2)  The  credit due  to  a  support  price cut of  the good,  subject  to 
quota is zero. 
Expression  (5)  shows  that  a  change  dpo  has  an  impact  on  DPSE  of  yOdpO 
but  no  effect  on  SIE  as  can  be  seen  from  expression  (6),  where  pO  does  not 
appear. 
Figure  3  illustrates  the  simple  case  of  a  price cut  by  dpo  smaller 
than  the wedge  between  pO  and  ~o.  The  only effect  is  a  cut  in  the 
decoupled  transfer  by  area a.  There  is  no  credit  to  be  gained  from  such an 
action if the  concept  of  trade distorting equivalent or  supply  inducing 
equivalent  is  the  one  chosen.  If however  political economy  considerations 
49 Figure  2 
Fiqure  2 - Chanqe  in  SIX  and  credit/debit  estilate  (case  of  a chanqe  in  quota  level) 
pO  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __ 
___  1 __ J 
I 
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d(PSE)  - -(b+c) 
d(SIE)  - -(a+c) 
d(DPSE)  - (a-b) Figure  3 
Figure  3 - Credit  and  support  price  cat  under  a constant  level  of  quota 
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Fiqure  4.  Effect  of  a decrease  in  input  subsidy  on  the  credit 
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52 or  inefficiencies due  to  the artificially created asset value of quota 
rights are  taken  in~o account,  some  weighted  sum  of  (DPSE)  and  (SIE)  might 
be  considered,  with  the  heavier weight  placed  on  SIE. 
b3)  A change  in  input  subsidies 
From  expression  (7),  when  only  d(ISO)  is different  from  zero,  the 
debit  amounts  to: 
Debit  =  d(SIE)  =  yO  d~o  +  d(ISO) 
where,  d~o =  (a~o/apl).  (apl/aISO).d(ISO). 
It can  be  noted  in  this  case  that  the  two  components  of d(SIE)  have 
opposite signs  under  normal  input  conditions since one  expects  that  a~o/apl 
> °  and  apI/alSo  < 0,  i.e.  a  positive effect of  input  prices  on  marginal 
cost  and  a  negative effect of subsidies on  input  prices. 
This  change  in  ISo  will have  an  effect on  both  DPSE  and  SIE.  The 
change  in  DPSE  is only  a  function  of  the  shadow  price,  which  is shifted  to 
or  from  SIE.  But  the  change  in SIE  is  the  negative of  the latter plus  the 
change  in  input  subsidies.  The  sum  of  the  two  components,  i.e.  d(PSE), 
will  therefore  be  affected  by  the  input  subsidy  change as  can also  be  seen 
directly  from  equation  (1). 
c)  Estimation of , the' shad~w price 'change 
In order  to  use expression  (8),  we  need  to  know  the initial level of 
the quota and  the gap  between  the  shadow  price and  the  free  trade or no 
policy price pO.  Ye  also need  to  estimate  the  change  in  the  shadow  price  w 
Yhen  there  is a  market  for  quota  rights  or  for  rented  quotas,  the  gap 
between  support  price  pO  and  shadow  price  ~o  can  be  estimated  on  that 
basis,  as  well  as  changes  in  the  level of  the  shadow  price over  time. 
53 In  the  case of  EC  where  a  real market  for  quotas  does  not exist in 
most  countries,4 we  will use  a  different approach  based  on  the  idea  that  in 
1983,  before  the  implementation  of  the  quota,  support  or  rather market 
price and  marginal  cost  (i.e.  shadow  price)  were  equal.  Then  the  simple 
comparative statistics of  the  dairy supply  function will provide an 
estimate of  the  shadow  price  change  from  1984  to  1988. 
The  shadow  price  change  is obtained  from  the  comparative statistics of 
the  supply  function  (3),  with  technical  change  included  and  yO  the  new 
policy  instrument  instead of  pO.  [The  shadow  price is now  endogenous]. 
dyo  =  as  d\.10  +  E as  dp11,  +  as-~t +  E  as  dK.  (9) 
a\.1 °  . -P:- at  J'  aK:"  J 
1  P  i  J 
This  expression  can  be  easily written in  terms  of  own  supply elasticity 
E  and  cross elasticities;  with  respect  to variable  input  prices E  .  = 
00  - 1  01 
alog  SI  alog  p  ;  with  respect  to  technical  change 
Eot  =  aLogS/at~ and  with  respect  to  quasi-fixed  inputs  Eoj  =  aLog  S/aLog 
K .• 
J 
Denoting  by  x = dlogx,  a  relative change: 
yO  = E  \.10  +  E E 
A1 
+  Eot dt  +  E  E  K.  (10)  oi  p  oj  00  i  i  g  J 
Since  the  shadow  price  \.10  is now  endogenous,  (10)  must  be  solved  for  \.10 
in  function  of  variables  yO, 
A1 
dt  and  K  exogenous  p  , 




Since  the  supply  function  is homogenous  of degree  zero  in prices,  E 
~o 
and  \.10  is homogenous  of degree one  in variable input  prices  p i'  E E  .  = 0 
01 
If price changes  are nominal 
similarly for  real changes. 
the  shadow  price cut  is also nominal,  and 
This  expression  shows  how  both shifts of  the  supply  curve  and  moves 
along  this  curve determine  the  shadow  price.  As  E  ,the own  price supply 
00 
elasticity,  is positive,  a  reduction  in  the  level of  the quota drives  the 
4.In section  3  where  practical matters will  be  discussed  further,  the 
results of  the  method  used  will  be  compared  with  the partial information 
available  on  quota  values. 
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+ shadow  price down.  Both  a  positive  technical  change  bias and  an  input 
price  fall work  in  the  same  direction  under  normal  conditions.  Such 
changes  will  tend  to  give  credit  for  policy adjustment  under  quota. 
However  the  flow  of  fixed  or  primary  factor  K.  out  of  the  industry at  rate 
J 
K.  > 0,  as  one  would  expect  to  be  the  case  in  the  farm  sector,  will  tend  to 
J 
slow  down  the  fall of  the  shadow  price. 
As  can  be  seen  from  table 1,  the  main  contributing factors  to  the  fall 
in  the  shadow  price  from  1986  to  1988  are  the  cut  in  the  level of  the quota 
and  the  rate of  technical  change.  When  the deflated  shadow  price is 
considered,  the  contribution of inputprites is also significant  (about  -7 
percent).  The  decrease  in primary  factor  use  works  as  expected  in  the 
opposite direction and  has  reduced  the  amount  of  credit  that  can  be 
requested  from  the  dairy quota.S  However  technical  change  bias  on  quasi-
fixed  inputs  (labor  and  capital)  more  than offsets  the  outflow  of resources 
from  the sector  (Mahe,  Guyomard  1989).  These  estimates will be  set  in 
wider  perspective  below,  since  policy  changes  carried out  in  the  EC  since 
1986  have  not  dealt  only with  the dairy sector. 
2.  The  multi-commodity  case  (small  country) 
The  previous  approach  can  be  extended  to  the whole  farm  sector in order 
to decompose  an  Aggregate  Measure  of  Support  (AMS)  into  two  components:  a 
Decoupled  Aggregate  Measure  of support  (DAMS)  and  a  Supply  Inducing 
Aggregate  Measure  of  Support  (SlAMS);"  Iri'the multi-commodity' case,  that is 
in  the multi-input,  multi-output  case,  cross effects  b~tween outputs  and 
inpu~s should  be  taken  into account.  The  AMS  change  must  include  the 
credit/debit on  commodities  under  quota and  the others  for  which  support 
prices have  been  adjusted. 
The  different  measures  of support  can  be  defined directly  from 
production  theory,  on  the  basis of several relevant  concepts  of  profit 
functions.  The  formulas  which  are eventually  used  in  the  implementation, 
are quite simple  and  can  be  understood  intuitively without  reading  the 
derivations  below. 
5.The  supply elasticities used  to  estimate  this  change  from  equation  (11) 
are derived  from  the  MISS  model,  as  revised  in  Mahe-Guyomard  (1989). 
55 Table  1 
Table  1 - 'rovisional  Estilate  Gf  Milk  ~bado' pri:e  chacqe  and 
credit  due  to  quotas  in  EC-IO  (1987-S!) 
(sinqle  cOllodity  - sial!  c~untry case) 
1.  Estilation  of  shadcw  price  variation  (per  cen~1'-
eon tribu tinq 
fac tor 
chanqe  in 
factor 
(per  cent) 
ilpact  in  ilpact  in 
nOlinal  terls  real  terls 
(per  cent)  (per  cent) 
quota  - a.s  - 9.4  -9.4 
technical 
chanqe  3.1  - 3.45  -3.4 
variable 
inputs  prices  +  1.13  -6.8 
quasi-fixed 
inputs  quantities  - 0.46  -0.46 
Total  shadol  price  variation 
nOlinal  -1~.l 
deflator  7.9 
deflated  -lO.1 
l. Estiaation  of  credit in terls,of  SIB  decuase.  ...  _.»" 
1986  quota  (lillian tonnes)  99 
1986  price'  (Bel1/tonne)  l78 
1986  shadol  price  (Bcu/t)  l33 
credit  (lillian tel1) 
ytdp'  4613 
(II' -p', Idy'  183 
Total  5396 
credit  (Iillion  ReUI 
I  see  annex  I  Ihere  the  cUlulative  evolutions  of  nClinal,  shadol  and  observed,  prices  of  lilt are  plotted. 
56 For  a  firm  facing  exogeneous  market  prices  (v1,  va),  but  with some 
netputs  constrained at  level  q~ several notions  of profit  functions  are 
useful  to  assess  income  transfers due  to various  changes  in  exogeneous 
variables.  The  first  is  the  unconstrained or long-run  total profit 
function  corresponding  to  the  case where all netputs are  free  to adjust  to 
their optimal level. 
u  1  1  1  1  n  (v  ,va)  =  MAX  [v.q  +  '10.  qO;  (q  ,qO)  €  TI  (12) 
1  (q  ,qO) 
6  1,  . 
where  q  is  the vector of  netputs  free  to  vary,  with  corresponding 
prices vI and  likewise  f~r quota and  restricted  inputs,  qO  and  va. 
The  second  is  the  constrained or short-run total profit  function  which 
corresponds  to  the  constrained profit actually received  under  rationing. 
It is  the  sum  of  the  restricted profit and  the value of  fixed  netputs at 
market  prices. 
c  1  r  1  n  (v  ,qO,VO)  =  n  (v  ,qO)  +  VO  qO  (13) 
1  where  n  (v  ,qO)  is  the restricted or variable profit  function  defined  by 
r 
nr  (v1,qO)  = Max  [v1  q1;  ql  €  T  (qO)  I  (14) 
(q1) 
The  third is  the virtual or  shadow  total profit  function,  which  is  the 
one  received  by  the  firm if it were  facing  v1  for  variable netputs  and  the 
'.  ,  '.  "  . -,  '::.,  , 
shadow  prices  lJ ° for  the  cons trained ones •.. 
v  1  u  1  ..r  1  n  (v  ,qO,lJO)  = n  (v  ,lJO)  =  11  (v  ,qO)  +  lJo  qO  (15) 
where"  by  Hotelling's  lemma,  lJo  = -aJf (v1,qO)/aqO,  which  defines  the 
virtual price as  a  function of variable netput  prices  and  the level of 
quotas.  lJo  does  not  depend  on  actual support  price  VO  but  actual profit  nC 
(.) does.  It should  be  noted  that when  all netputs  are in equilibrium  n U  = 
n
C  =  nV.  Furthermore,  the 'constrained profi t  function, n
C 
(.)  may  be  also 
written  by  using  (15)  as, 
c  1  u  1  n  (v  ,qO,lJO)  =  n  (v  ,lJO)  +  (vo-lJO).qO  (16) 
6.Transposed  vectors  are  not  explicitly indicated  as  it is clear  that v.q 
is  the  inner  product.  Matrix operations  below  are also written without 
the  transpose sign. 
57 From  these definitions,  an  AMS  is simply defined  as  the difference 
between  the  constrained profit  function  evaluated at  this point  (v1,qO,vo) 
where  prices are supported at  (v1,vo)  and  some  netputs  are restricted at  qO 
1  and  the unconstrained  profit  function  evaluated at  world  prices  (v  ,  va) 
W  W 
AMS  n
e  (v  1 ,qO,VO)  - n
U  1  va)  (v  ,  v  w1  =  nr  (Vr
qO)  - VO  qO  _  n
U  (v  ,VO) 
W  v  1  =  n
U  (v  ,IJO)  - 1J0  qO  +  VO  qO  _  n
U  (v  VO ) 
W  'v 
[nu  (v  1 ,IJO)  u  1  [(vo-IJO)  qOJ  =  - n  (v  ,va)]  +  w  w 
= [SlAMS]  +  [DAMS) 
In  the  case  of  a  small country,  that  i~ a,ssuming"dv1
w 
variation of  the aggregate measure  of  support  is obtained 
differentiation of  n
C  (v1,qO,vo)  i.e. 
c  1  d(AMS)  = dn  (v  ,qO,VO) 





= dvo  =  w 
by  total 
(21) 
This  differentiation may  be  also written using  (18)  as. 
d(AMS)  r  1  1  r  dqo  +  qO  dvO  (an lav  )dv  +  (an laqO)  dqo  +  VO  . 
=  (anr/av1)dv1  +  qO  dvO +  [vo_1J0(v1,  qO)]  dqO 
1  1 
+  [va  -lJo  (v1,  qO»)  dqo  (22)  =  q  dv  +  qOdvO 
0,  the 
Differentiating  the alternative expression of  n
C
,  i.e.  equation  (16), 
we  obtain 
c  1  d(AMS)  = dn  (v  ,qO,VO) 
u  1  1  = d n  (v,  IJ ° (v  ,q  0»  +  d «  v ° - IJ 0). •  q 0 ). 
= d(SIAMS)  +  d  (DAMS) 
The  variation of  the  AMS  is  the  sum  of  two  components:  (i),  the 
variation of  the  SlAMS  which  measures  supply  inducing aggregate measure  of 
support  effects and  (ii),  the variation of  the  DAMS  which  has  no  impact  on 
supply.  The  variations  of  both measures  may  be  written as  a  function  of 
exogeneous  or  control variables  (v1,  qO,  va) 
U  1  d(SIAMS)  =  dn  (v,  1J0  (v1,  qO» 
u  1  1  u  1  1  = (an lav  )dv  +  (an lalJO)  [(oIJOlov  )  dv  +  (oIJO/aqO)dqO] 
1  1  2  r  1  1  2  r 
=  q  .dv  +  qO  [-(0  n  10qOav  )  dv  -0 II  IClqOClqO)dqO]  (23) 
d(DAMS)  =  d  [(va  - IJO)  qOJ 
(VO  - IJO)  dqo  +  qO  (dvO  -dIJO) 
(VO _  \.10)  dqo  +  qO  dvO _qO  [_(02nr/ClqOClv1)  dv1 
58 The  importance  of  this  decomposition  is illustrated in figures  5  to  7 
where  only  one  exogen·eous  variable  changes  at  a  time,  the  other  instrument 
variables  being held constant.  To  make  the  results more  transparent  and 
easier  to  interpret, .we  consider  the  case of  a  single rationed output. 
a)  Change  in quota level 
First,  let us  consider  the  case  where  the  quota level  qO  varies  from  qO 
to  qO  + dqo  (figure 5).  Then  the variation of .the  AMS,  (holding 
dv1=dvo=dv1=dvo=0)  is by  (22),  .  w  w 
d(AMS)  =  (VO  _  ~o  (v1,qO»dqO 
= d(SIAMS)  +  d(DAMS) 
2  r  1  q °  [  _  (a n / aq °  aq °  ) .  dq 0]  +  [(  v ° - ~  ° (v  , q °  )  )  dq ° + 
2  r  q °  (a  n / aq °  aq 0) • dq 0]  (25) 
On  figure  5  dealing with  the  market  for  output  qO,  the variation in  the 
aggregate  measure  of  support  is given  by  the area -a;  d(SIAMS)  is given  by 
the area -(b+c+d)  and  d(DAMS)  is represented  by  -a+(b+c+d). 
b)  a  change  in support  price only 
The  second example  is simpler and  corresponds  to a  variation of  the 
market  price  VO  of  the "dutputunder qtiota.'·The' variations··of--the  three 
measures  of aggregate support are now  written as 
d(AMS)  =  qO  dvo  =  d(DAMS)  ;  d(SIAMS)  =0  (26) 
In  su~h a  case,  d(SIAMS)  is equal  to  zero since  n
U  evaluated with v1  and  ~o 
does  not  depend  on  VO  as  long as  the quota is binding,  i.e.  as  long as  the 
shadow  price  ~o is lower  than  the support  price va.  This  case is 
illustrated by  figure  6. 
c)  a  change  in variable netput  prices 
1  The  third particular case  corresponds  to  a  change  of  a  market  price v 
1  of  the  unconstrained  output  q  ,  other  instrument  variables  being held 
constant.  This  case  results  in 
dAMS  = ql  dv1 
= [ql  dv1  +  qO  a~o/avl dv1]  _  [qO  a~o/avl dv1]  (27) 
=  d(SIAMS)  +  d(DAMS) 
59 Figure  5 
Fiqure  5.  1KS,  SIAKS  and  OAKS  variations  in  the  case  of  a decrease  in  the  level  of  the  production  quota 
(~Vl =dv' =dvl ,dv' w =0) 






d(N1S) - - 4 
d (SIAMS) - -(b+<:+d) 
d(DN1S)--4 +(b+c+d) Figure 6 
riqure  6.  AKS,  SIlKS  and  OAKS  variations  in  the  case  of  a chanqe  in  the  aarket  price  of  the  output  under 




.  """ 
q 
d(lV4Sl  - - 6 
d(SIAMS)  - 0 
d(OAMS)  - - .. Figure  7 
riqures  7 : liS,  SIllS  et  DAKS  variations  in  the  case  of  a chanqe  in  the  larket  price  Vi  of  an  unconstrained 
output  qi. 
riqure  7a. 
pl ___ _ 
/  /./ //)  -------- ---., 
62 
riqure  7b. 






d(SIAMS)  is  represented  by  the  area a  on  figure  6a  corresponding  to  the 
1  output  q  market  plus  the area  b  on  figure  3b  corresponding  to  the output 
qO  market;  d(DAMS)  is  represented  by  the area -b on  figure  7b. 
To  conclude,  a  very  simple  expression based  on  expression  (23)  can  be 
used  to  evaluate  the overall debit,  when  the  relevant  shadow  prices are 
estimated  (see annex  II).  Using  y21  for  outputs  (prices  p1i ),  x1
j  for 
inputs  (prices  w1,)  and  yO  for  the quota  (shadow  price  ~O), 
Debit  = - credit  ~ d(SIAMS)  =  Ey1,  dp1,  +  yO  d~o - E xl,  dw1,  (28) 
1  1  J  J 
3.  Empirical  issues,  terms  of  trade and'assessment  of  results 
The  analytical expressions  presented  in  the  previous sections  provide a 
simple way  to  calculate  the debits and  credits,  when  the effects of  policy 
actions  on  prices are  known.  This  raises at least  three  issues  (i)  the 
actual contribution of  policy action  to  observed  changes  in prices  received 
and  paid  by  producers  (ii)  the  measurement  of  shadow  price changes  (iii) 
the  impact  of  policy action on  world  prices  which  may  also contribute  to  a 
decrease  in  the  SlAMS  when  support  is cut  and  prices  move  up  on  world 
markets. 
(i) Contribution of policy  changes  to  observed  market  prices 
No  perfect  answer  can  be  provided  to  this question as  part of  the 
observed  changes  in output  and  input  prices is due  to  the  reduction  in 
" 
price support,  but  part  is also due  to  changes  in the general economic 
outlQok;  and  in  the  case of  tariff-ridden commodities  world  market 
fluctuations  are  the  main  cause  for  price changes  on  the domestic market. 
In  the  empirical assessment  of  the debit/credit  for  EC  policy changes 
we  have  kept  in  the  calculation only  the  components  of  change  in supply 
inducing  income  support  which  can  be  easily connected  with  actual  EC  policy 
changes.  As  can  be  seen  in  table 2,  the effects of  observed  and  shadow 
price changes  are  included  into  the  credit  only  for  grains,  oilseeds,  beef, 
dairy  and  sugar  on  the  output side and  only  for  grains  on  the  variable 
input  side.  The  dramatic  change  in  pork and  poultry  prices,  the  r~duced 
price of  the  sub  aggregate  "rest  of  agriculture",  and  the  change  in 
intermediate  input  cost  are  not  included as  they  are not  considered as 
consequences  of  policy adjustments  from  1986  to  1988  but  rather as  results 
of  the  general  economic  situation. 
63 Table 2.  Summary  of credit for policy measures in EC  from  1986  to 1988 
(million ECU,  1986) 
actual  or  shadow' 
price  variation 
nOlinal  deflated 
(per  cent)  (per  cent) 




pori  and  poultry 
. rest  of  aqriculture 







other  feed 
other  into  consulpt 
- 3.7 
- 15.5 







..  - 0.8 












Debit  = total  chanqe  in  SIlKS  (siall  country) 
World  price  chanqe  effect 
Debit  = total  chanqe  in  SIlKS  (larqe  country) 
support  or  shadow  inclusion 
price  cut  in  the  debit 
(Iillion  ECO,  1986) 
- 2 850 
- 1 172 
136 
- 4 692 
219 
y' t d~' t 
- 4 844 
-11 t  dr't 
+ 1 462 
+  464 
+  20 
+  22 













- 7 540 
- 1 529 
- 9 069 
1  Suqar  contribution  to  the  credit  was  judqed  to  be  slall  and  neqliqible •• 
64 It should  he  noted  however,  that  when  an  output  is regulated  by  a 
quota,  the  changes  in cost,  technical  progress  and  market  conditions 
contribute indirectly  to  the  credit.  As  dairy and  sugar are  prevented  from 
expanding as  a  result  of  e.g.  technical change,  there is an  equivalent  cut 
in support  price which  should  be  included since it is due  to  the  role of 
the  restriction on  output  in  preventing market  conditions  to  influence  the 
level of supply. 
(ii)  Measurement  of  shadow  price  changes 
The  method  used  above  in  the estimation of shadow  price changes  depends 
on  the  parameters  of  the  supply equation.  In order  to  check  the  order of 
magnitude,  casual or quoted  information on  prices of quota  rights  for  rent 
or  for  sale were  used. 
The  estimates  quoted  in  table  3  are rather casual  in most  cases. 
However,  the  orders  of  magnitude  are not  so  far  away  from  our  estimate  for 
the  whole  of  EC-10,  which  amounts  to  a  decrease  in shadow  price of about  6 
percent  from  1983  to  1986  and  a  further  21  precent  from  1986  to  1988  (annex 
I). 
(iii)  terms  of  trade effects of  policy adjustment. 
The  general decciInposi tion .of  the" AMS'  given' iIi  section'  2  was': 
u  1  u  1  '  AMS  = [n  (v, lJO)  n (v  ,VO)]  +  (VO  _  lJO)  qO  w  w 
= SlAMS  +  DAMS 
Up  to  now  we  have  discussed  the effect of policy  changes  on  n U  (v1,lJo). 
If  there are policy  instruments  g  (n = 1,  •.•  N),  this effect  can  be 
n 
written as  the  total differential of  the virtual profit  function  around 
u  1  u  domestic  and  shadow  price level,  dn  (v  ,1I
0
)  =  E (an  (.)  /  ag  )  dg  - n  n 
Likewise  the  terms  of  trade effect of  polic9  changes  in EC,  has 
increased  the  level of  the virtual profit  function at  world  market  prices, 
d n
U  (v  1  ,v ° ) =  E (a  n
U 
(.)  /  ag  )  dg  w  w  n  n 
n 
In order  to  discover  the  magnitude  of  the  second effect,  the  MISS  model 
(Mahe,  Tavera et Trochet,  1988;  Guyomard,  Mahe,  Tavera et Trochet,  1988) 
was  used  to  assess  the  impact  of  policy  changes  on  world  prices.  Table  4 
65 summarizes  the  outcome  of  implementing  these  changes  in support  prices 
(grains,  oilseeds,  beef)  and  in  the dairy quota. 
66 table  3 
Inforlal  estilates  of  leasing  or  selling  prices  of  quota  rights  (1988) 
rental  sales  support  rate  of  quasirent 
price  price  price- - as  per  cent  of 
support  price' 
United  [ingdol  (£/1.)  0.06  0.0341  0.16  21-37  p.c. 
(Burrel,  1989) 
Ireland  (If/l.l  0.036  0.20  18.0  p.c. 
(Conny,  1989) 
Netherlands' (HlIl.1  3  0.75  40.0  p.c. 
Denlark' (D.  [r/l.)  4.5  2.0  22.5  p.c. 
France4  25-40  p.c. 
Sources  : 
I  Calculated  on  the  basis  ~f the  quoted  quota  price  of  1.700  S  per  cow  and  inforlal  inquiry. 
,  personal  interview 
,  personal  interview 
4  estiutes frol' cost  function  and  froii 'siailar I!thod  as  used  here  (Guyolud.  !ah~ 1989) 
,  When  i  sales  price  laS  the  data.  a 10  percentdisc'ount  rate  was  applied. 
67 table 
Table  3.  Tens  of  trade  effects  and  increase  in  fan inco.le  at  ,arId  lariet prices. 
function 






pori  and  poultry 
rest  of  agriculture 
Total  agriculture 
'arId  price  change 







change  in  profit 
at  ,arId  prices 
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ANNEX I. 
CUMULATIVE  EVOLUTION  OF  SHADOW  AND  OBSERVED  PRICES  OF 
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- SHAOOW  PRICE 
- 08SEFo'ED  PRICE ANNEX  II. 
This  appendix  is based  on  Mahe,  Guyomard  (1989)  and  Guyomard,  Mahe 
(1989) . 
When  all prices are given  and  producers  are  free  to adjust  immediately, 
the  familiar  producer  problem  is: . 
Max  [vq;  q  e:  T]  =  n U (v)  (a) 
(q) 
vhere q  is  the vector of  (n+m)  netputs quantities,  v  the vector of 
corresponding prices  and  nU (v)  the  (unconstrained)  profit  function.  The 
feasible set T  is assumed  strictly con-vex 'so tha  t  optimal quanti ties are 
uniquely determined  and  well  behaved  function  of  prices.  The  vector  q  is 
partitioned into  two  subvectors  of quantities  q1  always  variable and 
quantities  qO  susceptible of  being constrained.  A similar subdivision 
applies  to  the vector of  prices  v.  Problem  (a)  may  then  be  written as: 
Max  [v1  q1  + va  qa  ;  (q1,  qa)  e:  T]  = n U (v1,  va)  (b) 
(q1,  qa) 
The  complete  system of supply  response  can  be  written in  terms  of  the 
Jacobian  of  this unconstrained profit  function 
t
q1J  ~1" 
a 
[::] 
(Vi,  VO  )  nv  I v  0  (Vl,vo)] 
u  (c) 
dqO a  nv 0" I  (Vi,  vol  nv  0  "  0  (VI,VO ) 
,When ,quanti  ti~s".are  .. pegge.<t  .a.,t ..  .say'Jl~.,by.p.cU.~~y  .. ,~.n,~J,r\,\ments. (production 
quotas,  set-aside, ...  ),  variable quanti ties do' not ·behave··in·-the·same· way·  . 
with  respect  to  exogeneous  prices vl,  since  they are also a  function  of 
fixed ~uantities qa.  Oetine  ~o the vector of virtual prices,  which  ensure 
that  the unconstrained  quantities  qOu  as  functions  of prices will stay at 
level qO,  by: 
qOu  (vl ,  ~o  )  = qO 
Solving  (d)  for  the virtual 
define  the  relationship  betveen 
and  the  unconstrained  functions 
(d) 
prices  UO  as  function  of  vl  and  qO,  we  can 
the restricted behavioral  functions7 qlr(.) 
lu  q  (. ). 
7.When  some  netputs  ~a ire  fixed  at  qa,  therconftrained  producer  problem  is 
written as:  max  [v  q  ;  q  e:  T  iqa)]  =  n  (v, qa).  l~UPPtY and  demapd 
eq~ations  f~r variable netputs  q  are  then  given  by  q  (v,  qO)  = an 
(v  ,  q 0) /  av  . 
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Differentiating  (d)  and  (e)  yields 
u  u 
[d
q
]  [n  .... 
(Vl,~O )  nv 1 v 0  (v'  .~. ]  [dV' ]  =  U  U 
dqO  nv I  v 0  (Vi  I  ~o )  nv 0  v 0  (Vi  I  ~o )  dvo  (f) 
The  cross  partial derivatives of  n
U  are evaluated at  the  point  (v1, 
qO),  i.e.  (v1,  ~O(v1,qO».  The  comparative statics of  the  constrained 
regime  is obtained  by  solving (f)  for  the actual endogenous  variables 
(dq1u,  d~O) with  respect  to  the  new  set of exogenous  ones  which are  (dv1, 
dqO),  that is 
r
dql
]  = '.  : 1  v ~  -n: I  v 0  a( n: 0  v 0  )  - 1 
, dj,Jo  t  (nv 0  v 0  )  - 1  nv 0  v 1 
--
u 
nv 0  v 1 
u  u 
nv 1  .,  0  ( nv 0  v 0  )  - 1 
u 




The  virtual price  changes  are analyzed using  the  second  row  of  (g): 
these  changes  may  equivalently be  written in  terms  of unconstrained  price 
elasticities. 
(h) 
where  ~o  ,  v1  and  qO  are  the vectors of percentage  changes  in virtual 
prices,  unconstrained  netput  prices  and  fixed  netputs  respectively;  and  E 
and  Eo1  are  the matrices  of  price elasticities of  netputs  qO  under 
unconstrained  regime.  Technical  change  effects may  also  be  included  (for 
more  details,  see Guyomard  and  Mahe,  1989). 
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SELLING  CAP  REFORM  IN  TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS 
*  Fabrizio  De  Filippis and  Luca  Salvatici 
The  current  debate  about  the  opportunity of  including an  AMS  in  the 
eventual Uruguay  Round  agreement  on  agriculture has  promoted  the 
development  of  several  indicators.  Most  of  them  are  based  on  the  PSE 
framework  and  the  political discussion  seems  to  focus  on  this  indicator. 
Up  to  now  ,three major  problems  related  to  an  AMS  have  emerged  during  the 
negotiations: 
i)  the volatility of  the world  reference price; 
i1)  the  inclusion of  the structural  ("decoupled")  measures; 
iii)  the  concessions  of  "credits"  for  supply control measures. 
The  last point  is of great  importance  for  the  European  Community  since 
a  managed  supply  reduction  seems  to  be  the main  feature of  the  CAP  reform 
which  has  been  conceived  and  implemented  during  the  1980s. 
In  this  paper  we  address  the  issue of  how  the  new  instruments 
introduced  in  the  CAP  (quota,  set-aside,  "stabilizers")  can  be  handled  in a 
AMS  approach.  In particular we  focus  on  the  conceptual  problems  of 
bringing supply  control policies  under  the  PSE,  in  the next  section  the 
policies  implemented  by  the  EC  Commission  within  the  process of  CAP  reform 
will be  recalled briefly.  The  problem of  including such  measures  in  the 
PSE  calculations. is  I discussed"  .. in  ·.sec tion_, 3  .....  ,tbrough~.a,~JIIR~rc;lt~.vE!., graphical 
analysis of  the differences  among  various "poli-cies  .--.  Sec t-i-on  .. 4 ,~ntains., 
data on  the  present  degree of adoption of  the set-aside mechanism  and 
highlights  the  small  relevance of  this policy.  Finally,  some  tentative 
conclusions  are developed  to recall our main  results  and  to  point  out  the 
critical issues  presently under  negotiations. 
*  The  authors  are,  respectively,  an  Associate  Professor  and  a  Research 
Associate at  the  Department  of  Agricultural Economics,  University of 
Tuscia,  Viterbo  (Italy).  They  wish  to  thank Giovanni  Anania,  Michele  De 
Beneditis,  Carlo  Perone  Pacifico and  Ed  Rossmiller  for  their valuable 
comments  on  an  earlier draft.  This  paper  comes  from  a  research  project 
supported  by  the Italian Ministry  of  Education. 
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Viewed  from  the  evolution undergone  by  the  CAP,  supply  measures 
includes  mandatory  (quota systems)  or optional  regulations  (set-aside, 
extensification,  pre-retirement),  while  budget  measures  include actions 
like co-responsibility levies and  financial stabilizers.  Initially these 
two  approaches  have  been  used  jointly as  in  the  case of  sugar  regime,  which 
allows  export  restitutions paid  through a  co-responsibility levy,  only  to  a 
quota part  of  the  production.  Successively,  during  the  1980s,  the quota 
approach has  been  applied  to  the  milk sector with  the decision of  March 
1984,  now  generally considered as  the  turning-point  of  the  CAP.  More 
recently  the  focus  has  been  put  on  the  budget  measures  with  the stabilizers 
regime  and  with a  wider  use of co-responsibility levies. 
A brief illustration of  the most  important  policies  (quotas,  optional 
regulations,  co-responsibility-Ievies,  financial stabilizers),  is 
sufficient for  our  purpose.  Since most  of  them  are well  known,  our 
discussion will be  focused  mainly  on  some  peculiar characteristics, 
relevant  for  the analysis  carried out  in  the  next  section. 
A.  Quotas 
Quotas  are  the  most  straightforward instrument  of supply control as 
they  bind  the global  production  to a  fixed  quantity.  Their relative 
simplicity  from  the  conceptual  point  of view  and  their undoubted 
effectiveness have  suggested a  large use  of  this  policy.  The  principal 
products  subject  to  quotas are milk.and sugar,_which. c.onstitute  20%  of  the 
agricultural gross  output  in  the Community. 
-The main  characteristic of quotas  is  that  they guarantee a  fixed  price 
for  a  bound  quantity.  If the ceiling is overflowed  there  is a  sharp 
reduction  in  the  price received  on  the excess  quantity  produced.  This 
reduction  could  be  proportional  to  the  amount  of  the  overflow,  as  in  the 
case of sugar,  or  fixed,  as  in  that  of milk  but  the  crucial point  is  that 
the  price received within  the  quota  is not  subject  to  uncertainty. 
Finally,  it should  be  pointed out  that  in  this  case  the  emphasis  is 
placed  only  on  the  physical quantities.  In  fact,  as  far  as  international 
trade is  concerned~  the  size of  the  gap  between  domestic  and  world  prices 
is not  of great  significance;  what  really matters  is  the difference  between 
the  quota and  the quantity  that  would  have  been  produced  in a  free-trade 
74 scenario.  Therefore if quota policies are allowed,  negotiations  should 
focus  on  the  level of  output  and  we  will argue  in  the  next  section  that 
this  conclusion makes  the  calculation of  an  AMS  redundant  or  even 
misleading. 
B.  Optional  regulations 
Optional  regulations  include  those  policies  - like set-aside, 
extensification and  pre-retirement  schemes  - that  provide benefits  for  the 
farmers  who  agree  to  tak~  d~cisioI1.s  consistent with  the objective of 
curbing production.  Obviously;  the· impact .0Lsu.ch  po,licies  is much  less 
certain  than  in  the  case of quotas,  but  both are  part  of  a  "quantity-
oriented"  strategy in  tackling  the  problems  of saturated markets.  Yhile 
quotas  bind  the  final output,  the optional policies  impinge  on  factors  of 
production  (especially land)  in order  to  reduces  their use. 
There  is  no  need  to  stress  that  the effectiveness  of  these kinds  of 
policies  is uncertain,  depending  on  the  behavior of  farmers  and  on  the 
impact  of  technical progress  and  extension.  In  the  case of  the  EC  the 
situation is worsened  by  the  fact  that  these schemes  are  financed  within 
the structural policy of  the  EC  (Guidance  Section of  the  EAGGF)  which 
represents  less  than 5  percent  of  the global expenditure in  the 
agricultural sector.  In section 4  some  evidence is shown  of  the minimal 
impact  that  can be  forecasted  for  the  set-aside regulation. 
Nevertheless  i t'should  be'unde"scolied_that"#  ....  th~.e..,JllePt~m,r.E!~  .•. c.an  not  be 
judged  only  by  themselves ,  but  in the perspective' of  the changes. in  t~e" _  .. 
Common  structural policy.  In  the  1970s  the main  objective of  the 
structural policy was  to  increase efficiency of  the  farm  through 
investments  aimed  at  raising productivity.  Inevitably  this  approach  has 
boosted  production,  amplifying  the effects of price policies.  In  the 1980s 
the attitude  towards  structural  problems  has  changed  dramatically.  At 
present,  the major  concern  seems  to  be  the  consistency  between  structural 
policy and  the  needs  of  CAP  reform.  The  emphasis  is  placed  more  on  supply 
control  than on  farm  efficiency and  this is apparent  in  the  case of 
regulations  like set-aside,  which  distorts  the  relative prices  of  the 
productive  factors  (Boussard,  1988).  With  this  premise it can  be  argued 
that  the  relevance of  the  new  regulations  is amplified  by  the  fact  that 
they  replace old  regulations at variance with  them. 
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Co-responsibility levies are  the  simplest  way  to  take  into account 
budget  problems.  Even  if the  fixing of  high support  prices  together with 
the  imposing  of  levies  may  seem  contradictory in economic  terms,  it is 
well-know  that  farmers  seem  to  prefer  this kind  of  policy mix  to  a 
reduction  in support  prices.  As  a  matter of  fact  "basic levies",  equal  to 
3  percent  for  cereals  and  to  2  percent  for  sugar,  can also  be  considered as 
instruments  for  increasing  the  financial  resources  of  the  Community  and 
make  it possible  to  face  the  swift escalation of agricultural expenditures. 
However,  levies  can  also  be  used  as  flexible signals  for  farmers  to 
reduce  production.  In  this case  the  amount  of  the  levy  should  be  related 
to  the  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand,  as  in the of  the sugar  regime 
where  the  amount  of,the "additional levy"  is strictly related  to  the  budget 
expense.  The  same  could  be  said  for  the cereals  regime,  with a  "super 
levy"  that  is partially proportional  to  the  production overflow  from  the 
fixed  threshold.  In  this perspective  the co-responsibility levies 
represent  an  integral component  of  the  recent strategy of  the  Commission 
designed  to stabilize  the agricultural budget  expenditures. 
D.  Stabilizers 
After  the decisions  of  1988  the  "stabilizer" approach  should  be 
considered  the general strategy of  the  EC  as  the  Commission  claims  to  have 
introduced  this scheme  for  every product.  Actually  the official 
defini tion,  which  includes all ,the  a,utomatic  mechanisms  related  to  the 
overflow from  a  threshold,  seems  to  be  too  broad ,in as. ,far as. it includes 
also quotas  and  co-responsibility levies.  Instead,  it seems  more  useful  to 
draw·a distinction between different policies,  highlighting  the  peculiar 
features  of  the stabilizer mechanism. 
First,  the  budgetary  context  should  be  considered,  given  that  the 
increase  in  the  EAGGF  expenditure  is fixed.  As  a  consequence  financial 
guidelines are  fixed  for  each  product  and  the  intervention price depends  on 
the  output  as  long as  an  established  threshold  is exceeded.  The  crucial 
point  is  that  the  price reduction  impinges  on  the  whole  output,  whereas  in 
the  case of quotas  or  two-price  systems  only  the  production above  the 
threshold  is  involved.  Finally it is  important  to  underscore  that  the 
stabilizers are  implemented  on  a  multi-year  basis  (usually  3  years)  in 
order  to  reduce  the  uncertainty of  farmers  (and  of  budget  expenditure). 
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The  stabilizer system has  been  implemented  according  to  two  different 
schemes.  In  the  first  one  - adopted  for  products  like cereals,  fruit  and 
vegetables  - support  is  reduced  by  a  fixed  amount  in  the  following 
marketing year,  as  long  as  the  guarantee  threshold  is exceeded.  For 
example,  in  the  case of  cereals  the  exceeding of  the  threshold  implies  a 
price reduction of  3  percent  in  the  following year,  while  a  co-
responsibility levy  up  to  3  percent  is charged  in  the  same  year 
proportionally  to  the  overshooting  in  production.  The  crucial feature  of 
this  scheme  is  that  penalty price  reductions  are  cumulative,  in  the  sense 
that  they are carried over  from  one  year. to.another.  This  is shown  in 
figure  1,  where  OM  is  the guaranteethreshold-and.P.  is  the  intervention 
.  0 
price.  Since  the output  (00)  corresponding  to  this  price exceeds  the 
threshold,  in  the  the  following year  the  price will be  PI  and  further 
reductions of  the  same  percentage  could  take  place in  the  following  years 
as  long as  there is an  overshooting  in production.  Obviously  this  process 
could  converge  on  the  world  price,  provided  that  the  threshold  is fixed 
equal  to  the  free-trade  output  or  that  we  allow  a  downward  shift of  the 
8  supply  curve  induced  by  technical  progress  As  far  as  the  second 
scheme  - adopted  for  products  like oilseeds  and  tobacco  - is concerned  the 
overshooting of  the  guarantee. threshold  implies  a  reduction  in  producer 
price  that  is proportional and  takes  place  in  the  same  year,  but  is not 
cumulative:  this  means  that  the  following  market  year will start again 
wi th  the  previous  level of  suppor t.  In  the  case of oilseeds,  for  example, 
the exceeding of  the' threshold'impH:'es ·a··'reduc-tion  ....  -ln··,the, .aid. according  to 
a  coefficient of 0.5.9  This  is shown  in figure  2,  where  the  producer ':' 
price is P,  but  if the quantity  OOM  is exceeded,  there is a  price reduction 
according  to  the line CF  that  is drawn  on  the basis of  the  reduction 
8.In  the  "large country  case"  this  process  would  be  even  more  evident.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  supply  reduction within  the  country would  imply  an 
upward  move  in  the  world  price line  (Pw)  and  this  corresponds  to  an 
increase  in  the  free-trade  output  (point  L would  shift  to  the  right  along 
the  supply  curve). 
9.That  is  a  0.5  percentage  point  reduction  in  the  producer  price  for  each 
percentage  point  of  overshooting  in  production. 
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78 coefficient.  Since  there is not  a  cumulative  process  of price reduction as 
in  the  previolls  case,  in  each year  the starting producer  price is 
maintained at  P  (at least during  the multi-year  program). 
In conclusion  we  can  point  out  that  the latter scheme  seems  more 
effective in stabilizing  the  budget  expenditure year  by  year.  On  the other 
hand  the  first  scheme  seems  more  suitable in  the  long  run  as it allows  a 
gradual  reduction  of  the gap  between  domestic  and  international prices, 
provided  that  the guarantee  threshold  is fixed  appropriately. 
As  far  as  the  European  Community  is  concerned,  it should  be  emphasized 
that  supply  control and  expenditur.e.control.poli~ies are strictly 
interlinked.  In  the  EC  perspective both sbare·the·same goals,  that  is  to 
curb production and  to  reduce  budget  costs,  but  it is important  to  point 
out  that  supply  policies  have  a  direct effect on  saturated markets  while  in 
the  case of expenditure policies  the quantitative reduction of production 
is an  indirect and  uncertain result.  Consequently,  from  the  international 
point  of view  the  first  class of  instruments  seems  more  effective at least 
in  the short  run:  for  example,  if the  demand  for  imports  were  to  increase, 
a  quota would  hold  the  domestic  production constant  and  permit  the full 
increase in demand  to  be  imported,  while  the  same  would  not  be  necessarily 
true with expenditure  control policies.  On  the other hand  it will be  seen 
in  the  next  section  that  the  PSE  is more  sensitive  to  the effects of  the 
financial stabilizers  than  to  the effects of quotas:  this  could  be 
particularly relevant given  that  expenditure  control policies  in  the 
current  CAP  framework  seems -bound  to ·play·--a.-greater,role··inthe near 
future. 
3.  Bringing Control Measures  Under  PSE 
This  section concentrates  on  the  problems  which  arise dealing with  the 
supply-expenditure control measures  in an  AMS  framework.  In particular, 
the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the sensitivity of  the  PSE  with  respect  to  the 
effects of  these  measures  in  terms  of  reduction  in  trade distortions 
induced  by  agricultural support  as  well as  the  possibility and  opportunity 
of giving some  "credits"  to  the  country  (EC  in  our  example)  that  is 
adopting  them. 
In  this  context  there are  two  main  features  that  are crucial: 
i)  the  capability of  the  PSE  to  capture  the  effect  of  the  initial 
adoption  of  a  supply-expenditure control  measure  in  the  EC  price 
support  system; 






F ii)  the sensitivity of  the  PSE  with  regard  to  the yearly  implementation 
of  these  measures,  once  they  have  been  put  into operation. 
The  following discussion  is  based  on  the standard  demand-supply  partial 
equilibrium analytical  framework.  For  the  sake  of simplicity our graphical 
representation  relies upon  the  small  country  assumption,  but  in  the  comment 
we  will  try  to  take  into account  some  implications  of  the  large  country 
case. 
A.  Production  quotas 
In figure  3,  Pw  is  the world  price and  P  the  EC  intervention price.  In 
the absence  of  supply  control  ~eastire~;-'ptoductlo~ is 001'  consumption  002 
and  export  AB,  with  a  total amount  of export  restitutions equal  to  ABFC. 
In  the absence  of other measures  the  percent  PSE  is: 
=  P-Pw 
-P-
If a  production quota 003  is  imposed,  the subsidized export  falls  to 
AE,  the  EC  expenditure  is  reduced  to  AEGC,  but  the  percent  PSE  remains 
unchanged: 
%PSE  = 003(p_pw)  = P-Pw 
003P  -P-
The  percent  PSE  could  decrease  in  the  large country case,  in 
proportion of  the  increase  in'Pw'resultin~from' th.reduction-in-export 
induced  by  the  production quota.  But  this is only an  indirect  (and 
probably  in many  cases  not  substantial) effect,  which  could  be  considered 
an  inadequate  recognition of  the supply control actions  in  terms  of 
reduction of  the  AMS. 
This  shortcoming  could  be  circumvented  using  the  total PSE  (PSET) 
instead of  the  percent  PSE,  that  is  the numerator  of  the  ratio  (McClatchy, 
1987).  In  fact  PSET  is perfectly sensitive both  to  the  reduction  in  Q 
induced  by  the quota and  (in  the  large country  case)  to  the  increase  in  Pw 
induced  by  the  reduction  in export.  A problem  which  arises with  PSET  is 
that,  while it could  be  considered  a  suitable indicator  for  monitoring  a 
given  reduction  of  the  support,  it is not  appropriate  for  comparing  the 
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performs  better,  so  the  problem  becomes  how  to  incorporate  in its 
calculation some  "credit"  for  countries  imposing  production quotas. 
As  a  general  rule,  a  credit  could  be  given deriving  the  "price 
reduction equivalent"  of  the quota:  at first glance,  the  shadow  price of 
the .quota  could  be  considered  Po  in figure  3,  that  is  the price 
corresponding  to  an  output  equal  to  the  quota  (03)  along  the domestic 
supply  curve.  But,  in  the  AMS  approach,  what  we  need  is a  shadow  price 
equivalent  to  the  quota  in  terms  of support  rather  than  in  terms  of output. 
This  means  that  we  have  to  find that  price which,  in  the absence of any 
quota,  would  imply  a  reducti()n  in  PSET  equal- to"that  under  the quota 
regime.  Vith  reference  to  figure  3,  since  the  reduction  in  PSET  induced  by 
the  quota is  the area EBFG,  the  corresponding shadow  intervention price 
would  be  P',  providing  that  the area PBIP'  plus  IBFL  is equal  to  the area 
EBFG.  The  use  of  P'  would  ensure a  reduction of  the  "quota  total-support-
compensated  PSE"  (PSE01),  which  becomes 
PSEol  =  P'-Pw  < PSE  =  P-Pw 
P'  P 
In a  different approach,  one  could  focus  the attention on  the effect 
of  quotas  in reducing  trade distortion rather  than  the  total amount  of 
support.11  In  this case  the  shadow  intervention price should  be  the  price 
that,  in  the  absence  of any  quota,  would  imply  an  amount  of subsidized 
export  (A'E')  equal  to  that  (AE)  coming  out· as'result of  the quota  regime. 
In  figure  3  this price would  be  P";  since it is lower  than 'p",the "credit't--
in  terms  of  reduction of  the  "quota  trade-dis tort  ion-compensated PSE" 
-" 
(PSE02)  would  be  greater: 
PSE02 = P"-Pv < PSE01  < PSE 
P" 
lO.One  advantage  of  the  AMS  approach  is  the  possibility of negotiating a 
reduction  in agricultural support  based  on  some  "formula."  Obviously  in 
such  an  approach  an  indicator of  the starting level of  support  is 
important  to  determine  the  burden  of  the  adjustment  for  each  country. 
11.This approach  is consistent  with  the early  theoretical rationale of 
trade distortion equivalent  rather  than  PSE  (McClatchy,  May  1987). 
83 In  the  large  country case,  the  decrease  of  the  "quota  compensated 
PSE's"  would  be  reinforced  by  the  increase in  Pw  that  is due  to  the 
reduction  in export  ensured  by  the  production quota.  Obviously,  this 
further  decrease of  the  PSEQ  would  be  analogous  to  the already mentioned  s 
"indirect"  decrease  jn  the  uncompensated  percent  PSE. 
Yhat  has  been  said  up  to  now  is related  to  the  problem of  capturing  by 
an  AMS  the effect 01  the initial adoption of a  quota system:  the use  of an 
indicator of  total amount  of  support  (PSET  in our  example)  or  the 
derivation of  a  "price reduction equivalent"  could  be  workable solutions. 
However,  when  a  production quota-is already-In-operation,  the  problem  of 
capturing by  an  AMS  the effects of its yearly  implementation is less 
straightforward.  First of all,  it is  impossible  to  derive a  price 
reduction equivalent  because  the unrestricted supply  curve  (along which  we 
should move  to  find  it) does  not exist any  more.  Furthermore,  an  indicator 
of  total amount  of  support  such as  the  PSET  is an  unreliable instrument  in 
this  context:  for  example,  a  reduction  in  the  production quota,  that  is a 
reduction  in exportable surplus  or an  increase in demand  for  imports 
towards  the  free  trade  levels of  these variables,  implies  a  reduction  in 
trade distortion;  but  if it is associated with an  increase  in  the domestic 
producer  price  the  change  of  the  PSET  will not  be  proportional  to  this 
improvement:  in  the  extreme  case,  in which  the  increase in producer  price 
were  more  than  proportional  to  the decrease in production,  the  PSET  would 
even  increase.· 
More  generally,  when  compulsory  supply  control measures  like quotas 
are  in operation,  it does  not  make  much  sense  to  use  an  AMS  like the  PSE 
based on  price differentials:  in fact,  as  far as  trade distortion is 
concerned,  supply control should  be  considered as  the crucial variable and 
hierarchically superior  to  any  domestic  price maneuver.  Probably  in this 
context  the  problem  of  "credits" or "debits"  to  be  given  to  the 
implementation of  a  quota  system  is just a  matter of  negotiation,  which 
addresses directly  the  physical quantities exported  or  imported. 
B.  Set-aside 
As  we  said  in  the  first  section of  this  paper~  EC  structural policy  is 
shifting the  focus  of  its effort  from  economic  efficiency  to  supply 
control.  In  the last  two  years  this action has  taken  the  form  of optional 
84 measures  (incentives),  oriented  to  the  reduction  in  the use  in agriculture 
of  factors like land  (set-aside),  labor  (pre-retirement),  fertilizers  and 
pesticides  (extensification).  The  effects of  these  measures  are very 
similar.  In  figure  4  the  case of set-aside is illustrated.  The  starting 
point  is a  world  price  Pw,  a  national  producer  price  P,  a  production 00  •  o 
In  the  absence of other measures  of  support  the  PSE's  are: 
PSET 
%PSE 
(P-Pw). °  o 
(P-Pw).Q 





Yhen  set-aside is  in operation,  its effect  is an  inward shift of  the 
supply  curve  from  So  to  Sl  and  a  budget  expenditure at least equal  to  the 
area ADF.12  The  production  falls  from  00  to 01  and  subsidized export  from 
EA  to  ED,  with  a  saving in Community  expenditure  for  export  refunds,  equal 
to  the  area  ABCD.  The  PSE  are:  s 
PSET  =  (P-Pw) .01  +  "B"  =  PDCPw  +  "B" 
%PSE  =  (P-Pw).Ol  +  "B"  P-Pw  +  "B" 
POl  -P- POl 
Yhere  "B"  is  the  total amount  of set-aside compensation  payments  given  to 
farmers.  This  means  that  the  uncompensated  percent  PSE  surely increases, 
while  PSET  increases  or  d~crea~es  depe~ding on  the magnitude  of  "B",  that 
has  to  be  added  to  the  PSET,  in comparison with  the area ABCD,  which 
disappears as  a  consequence  of set-aside.  Since  this area represents  the 
induced  saving  in export  restitutions,  we  can  conclude  that  PSET  will 
decrease as  a  consequence  of set-aside only so  far as  this  policy will 
12.This  is  the  producer  surplus  that  is lost as  a  consequence  of  the shift 
of  supply  curve  induced  by  set-aside.  An  obvious  assumption  is  that  the 
compensation  payments  from  the  budget  have  to  be  at least equal  to  the 
profit lost  by  producers  who  are  sharing  the set-aside program. 
85 Figure  4:  Set-aside 










86 ·  If  b  ff"  .  d'  d'  13  Th  f  prove  ltse  to  e  e  lClent  ln re uClng  expen  lture.  ese responses  0 
the  PSE  to  a  policy designed  to  curb  production are  not  helpful,  since  they 
don't give  recognition  to  an action  that  should  be  considered desirable as 
far  as  trade distortions are  concerned.  Consequently,  a  problem arises of 
giving some  "credit." 
The  most  obvious  "credit"  to  be  given  to set-aside would  be  to 
consider it a  fully  decoupled  policy and  then  to  forget  "B"  in  the 
calculation of  PSE.  This  is consistent with  the  EC  approach  to  AHS,  since  s 
the  indicator proposed  by  the  Community  (SHU)  does  not  take  into account 
the  (structural)  measures,  decoupled.from quantity, produced.  In  this way 
the  PSET  decreases,  but  percent  PSE  still remains unchanged.  As  in  the 
case of  a  quota,  the  issue of giving credit for  set-aside in  terms  of 
percent  PSE  reduction,  could  be  faced  by  deriving its price reduction 
equivalent.14  In our  example,  P'  is  the  shadow  intervention price 
corresponding,  in  the  absence of set-aside,  to  a  reduction in  PSET  equal  to 
that  induced  by  set-aside,  omitting  the  "B"  component  (the area P'GIPw  is 
equal  to  the  area PDCPw).  Conversely,  in a  TDE  rationale,  P"  is  the  shadow 
intervention price which,  in  the  absence of set-aside,  would  imply  an 
amount  of subsidized exports  (E'D)  equal  to  that  (ED)  resulting  from  set-
aside.  Obviously,  by  using  P'  or P"  instead of  P,  the value of  percent  PSE 
falls: 
P-Pw  > P'-Pw > P"-Pw  ---P- ----P-,  --pn-
Also  in  the  case of set-aside ,for a  large country,'  'PSE  reduction  could  be 
reinforced  by  the  increase  in Pw  induced  by  the  related reduction of export 
or  increase of  import. 
13.In a  recent  paper Koester  (Koester  1989)  shows  that  in  the  EC  context it 
might  be  very difficult  to obtain  this  outcome. 
14.Also  in  this  case  the derivation of  a  shadow  intervention price 
presupposes  the  estimation of  the  "unrestricted" supply  curve.  But 
differently  from  the  quota case,  since  the  amount  of set-aside land is 
known,  this  estimation should  be  possible.  This  means  that  in  theory 
also  the yearly  implementation of set-aside could  be  taken  into account 
by  this approach. 
87 C.  Stabilizers 
In  the  first  section it has  been  pointed  out  that  the  implementation 
of  financial stabilizers  can  be  considered as  the  major  feature  of  the 
current  EC  approach  to  CAP  reform.  In  this sense it is  important  to  test 
the  performance  of  PSE  in capturing  the effects of  the  stabilizer  s 
mechanisms. 
Let  us  start with  the  oilseed-type  regime,  that  is  to  say  a 
proportional and  non-cumulative  producer  price penalty which  is applied  in 
the  same  year  in which  the  Maximum  Guaranteed  Quantity  (MGQ)  is overshot. 
In figure  2,  Pw  is  the  world  price,  P  the  domestic  producer  price and  S  the 
supply  curve.  In  the absence.of  a  st.abiUz~raI!d.of any  other control 
measure,  production would  be  OQ  with  a  PSET  amounting  to  the area  PABPw  o 
and  a  percent  PSE  equal  to  (P-Pw)/P.  If a  stabilizer is put  into operation 
with  a  MGQ  fixed at Q ,  there are  three main  possible outcomes.  m 
i)  If farmers  have  access  to  perfect  information both  on  policies and  on 
other  farmers'  responses  and  if  they  behave  rationally on  a 
collective basis,  the whole  agricultural sector can  be  considered as 
a  single monopolistic  firm,  facing a  kinked  marginal  revenue  curve 
like  PCEG  in  figure  2.15  In such  a  context  the output  response 
depends  on  the magnitude  of  the  MGQ  and  on  the supply elasticity.  If 
the elasticity is high and/or  the  MGQ  is small,  the supply curve will 
cross  the  marginal  revenue  cur·ve" on~the· dgh  t· 0 f  poin  t. E"  and  the 
output which  maximizes  the aggregate producer surplus will exceed  the 
15.This  is not  just a  theoretical case:  for  example  it could apply  to  the 
production  of  soya  in Italy,  where  all the  producer are strictly 
controlled  by  a  single  food  processor  (i.e.  Ferruzzi). 
88 MGO. 16  More  probably,  as it is shown  in figure  2,  the  intersection 
will take  place  between  points  C and  E,  with an  optimal output  equal 
to  the  MGO.  In  this  case,  a  collusive agreement  should  provide a 
compensation  from  more  efficient  farmers  in  favour  of  those  who  are 
giving up  production.  As  far as  PSEs  are concerned,  we  are  back  to 
the quota case,  with  a  PSET  that  decreases  from  PABPw  to  PCIPw  and  a 
percent  PSE  that  remains  unchanged. 
ii)  At  the  other extreme,  .with.bad·information and  absence of mutual 
commitment,  farmers  will continue  to  respond  to  price P:  the 
production  remains  unchanged  at a ,  but  the  producer  price falls  to  o 
Pl· 
iii)  An  intermediate and  probably  more  realistic scenario is  the  presence 
of good  information and  the  lack of  collusive behaviour;  in this  case 
farms  will  produce  a  quantity  ranging  from  OM  to 0
0
,  receiving a 
price  ranging  from  P1  to  P.  In  the  figure  point  0  is indicated, 
which  corresponds  to  a  situation of  perfect  information. 
In  the last  two  cases  both  PSET  and  percent  PSE  will decrease,  but 
they  perform well  in capturing  the  reduction  in  trade distortion only 
in  the iii) situation:  in  this  case,  with price at P2  and  production 
at 01,  lower values  of  PSET  and  PE7rcent  PSE  reflect a  real reduction 
in production and  (consequently)  in  trade distortion,  while  in  the 
16.It is important  to  point  out  that  the  MGQ  is an  indicative production 
target  for  the  EC  as  a  whole  and  not  for  each  farmer:  in  the  case  of 
overshooting  farmers  who  did  expand  production  receive as  much  for  each 
tonne  produced  as  those  who  did  not  expand  or even  reduced  production. 
This  implies  a  contradiction between  collective and  individual 
rationality,  that  is  the  classic issue concerning  free  riding. 
89 ii) case,  with  the  production  remaining 
penalty  reduction of  the  producer price. 
at 0  "  they  reflec  t  only  the  o 
These  problems  are 
connected  to  the  first adoption  of  the stabilizer,  but  they  partially 
disappear  in  the  following years,  when  also  in  the  simplest  case of 
adaptive expectations,  only  based  on  the  price received  in  the 
previous year,  the  market  equilibrium is probably  bound  to  converge 
d  h  .  D 17  towar  s  t  e  pOlnt  . 
The  cereal-type  regime  (figure 1)  seems  to  be  less complex as,  in  the 
case of  overshooting,  the  price penalty  takes  place in  the  following 
year and  the  reduced  price is carried over  from  one  year  to 
another.18  Provided  that  the  farmers'  strategy is not  collusive and 
is not  based  on  a  multi-year maximization of  the global  producer 
surplus,  the  final  result will be  a  production  DOM (that is equal  to 
MGO)  with  a  price  reduced  to  P3.  As  far as  the  PSE  is concerned, 
both  PSET  and  percent  PSE  will decrease,  reflecting  the  reduction  in 
trade distortions,  even  if with a  lag of  one year. 
4.  The  Set-Aside Regulation 
The  set-aside regulation,  issued  in 1988,  commits  the  participating 
farme~s.to a  reduction  of at least 20  percent  of  their land  for  three years 
or more.  The  Commission  forecasted  that about  one  million hectares would 
have  been  involved,  that  is less  than  3  percent of  the  EC  arable land,  with 
17.This  happens  provided  that  the  supply  curve  is sufficiently inelastic 
and/or  the  MGQ  is small  enough  to  leave  point  M on  its right. 
18.For  the  sake  of  simplicity we  do  not  consider here  the  coresponsibility 
levy  that  is  charged  (up  to  3%)  in  the  same  year  proportionally  to  the 
overshooting. 
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a  budget  cost  of  140  millions  BCU,  which  corresponds  to  less  than  1  percent 
of  the agricultural expenditures. 
Table  1  shows  the  data referring  to  the  1988-89  agricultural season, 
that  is,  the  first year  of  implementation of  the  program.  Even  though  in 
Denmark  and  Luxemburg  the  scheme  was  not  yet  applied,  440,456  hectares  have 
been  set aside.  The  highest  number  of applications  occurred  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  and  in  Italy,  while  France,  which  is  the most  important 
agricultural  producer,  has  a  share of  only  3  percent  of  the  total land set 
aside  (the  French share  in  the Community  arable  land  amounts  to  25 
percent).  Moreover,  we  can'see  that  the  proportion of the area set-aside 
as  a  percentage of  arable  land  is extremely' low  (0.92%)  and  the  same  holds 
for  the area in cereals  (1.33%),  which  can  be  considered  the main  objective 
of  this  policy. 
In order  to  carry out  a  deeper analysis it would  be  necessary  to  have 
more  information  about  the yields  in  the area set aside.  As  far as Italy 
is concerned  only  16  percent  of  the area set aside  is  located on  the  plain  • 
If this  proportion were  confirmed  in  the other Member  States,  as it seems 
reasonable,  the  impact  of  the  scheme  on  the global output will be  really 
negligible.  Just  in order  to  have  an  idea of  the  impact  we  can assume  that 
all the  land  set aside is  from  cereals  and  that  the average yield on 
this  land  is equal  to  the  Community  average.  According  to  these 
assumptions  there  is a  clear overestimation,  but  even  in  this  case  the 
supply  reduction amounts  to  about  2  millions  of  tons,  that  is less  than 1.7 
percent  of  the output  in 1987  (E.C.  Commission,  1989). 
Finally,  it is possible  to work  out  a  tentative estimate of  the  PSE 
redu~;~on implied  by  the  previous  output  reduction  (2  millions  tons  of 
cereals).  Given  that  we  use  PSE  estimates  published  by  the  USDA  for  1986, 
there  is no  need  to  take  into account  budget  expenditure  related  to set-
aside  implementation.  Ye  simply calculate  the average difference  between 
internal and  world  prices of cereals,  then we  multiply  this  figure 
($76/ton)  by  the  forecasted  reduction.  The  final  outcome,  about  $170 
million,  corresponds  to  less  than  2  percent  of  the  total  PSE  of  cereals 
(more  than  59000  million)  for  that year.  Since  our  figures  most  probably 
overestimate  the effective  impact  of  the  policy,  we  can  conclude  that set-
aside is,  at  this  moment,  of little relevance  in  controlling  BC  oversupply. 
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N 
Member  Number  of  in 
State  appli- hectares 
cations 
FRG  25,289  169,729 
IT  9,806  160,089 
UK  1,750  54,779 
SP  518  34,229 
FR  1,002  15,707 
IRL  77  1,310 
NL  195  2,621 
GR  NA  NA 
BE  32  329 
TOTAL  39,235  442,456 
TABLE  1 
Area  of  lands  set aside,  number  of  holdings  participating 
and  use  of  land,  by  Member  State 
Area  to  be  set-aside of which  %  .  . 
rotational  permanent  afforest- extensive  Non  agri  Chick 
fallow  fallow  ation  grazing  use  peas,  etc. 
47.3  52.8  0.5  1.1  0.3  -
25.06  44 .. 5  3.47  24.02  0.76  2.17 
11.01  79.67  1.44  - 7.74  -
29  41.3  4.1  5.1  0.9  : 19.8 
28.93  62.6  4.97  - 3.6  -
2.53  23.49  3.16  64.57  6.25  -
63.49  31. 72  4.04  - 0.47  - , 
, 
NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
18.1  42.45  10.1  7.4  21.6  -
32.45  51.96  2.12  9.47  1.59  2.33 
-
Proportion of  the Average 
area set-aside as area set 
a  percentage of  aside  per 
applicant 
arable  area  in  (in 
land  cereals  hectares) 
2.4  3.6  6.70 
1.87  3.17  16.73 
0.93  1.37  31.3 
0.35  0.45  66.1 
- 0.16  15.68 
0.13  0.37  17.01 
0.29  1.32  13.44 
NA  NA  NA 
- - 10.28 
0.92  1.33  11.31  ., 
- -- ---- - -_._---
SOURCE:  Information  communicated  by  Member  States,  16  June  1989.  The  scheme  was  not  applied  in Denmark  or Luxemburg  in  the 
1988-89  agricultural season.  Portugal is exempt. 
NA  = Not  available 5.  Concluding Remarks 
Curbing  production and  keeping  budget  expenditure  below  a  fixed  ceiling 
are  the  main  objectives of  the  CAP  reform.  Obviously,  supply  control 
measures  and  financial stabilizers are strictly interlinked  from  an  EC 
point  of  view,  but  their  implications  could  be  very different  on  the 
international arena.  In particular,  supply policies like quotas  have  a 
direct effect  on  saturated markets  and,  consequently,  could  be  very 
effective  in  reducing or controlling  trade distortions.  Conversely,  in  the 
case of financial  measures  like stabilizers,  the  production  (and  trade) 
effect is an  indirect and  uricertain resulL  ·Ort  the other hand,  as  far as 
the  monitoring of  these effects is concerned,  it has  been  shown  that  the 
PSE  is almost  fully sensitive  to  the effect of  financial stabilizers;  on 
the  contrary as  a  price-based indicator,  the  PSE  is partially inconsistent 
with  physical and  compulsory  supply control measures  like quotas.  In 
particular with  respect  to  the  PSE's  capability of monitoring  the effect of 
single measures,  our graphical analysis  has  highlighted  the  following 
.  19  pOlnts: 
i)  Quotas:  the  percent  PSE  is not  sensitive at all;  a  credit  could  be 
given  in  terms  of  price reduction equivalent  (shadow  prices),  but 
only  for  the first adoption of  a  quota,  when  an  unrestricted supply 
curve exists.  The  total PSE  (PSET)  is fully sensitive,  provided  that 
the gap  between  domestic  and  world  price does  not  increase within  the 
quota. 
ii)  Optional measures  (e.g.  set-aside):  percent  P~E is sensitive in a 
"wrong"  way:  in  fact it captures  the  increase  in domestic support  but 
not  the  hoped  effect  in production.  In order  to  keep  the  percent  PSE 
constant,  an  obvious  "credit"  is  to  dismiss  the  budget  expenditure 
("B"  component)  from  its calculation.  A further credit which  would 
allow a  reduction  in  the  percent  PSE,  could  be  the  use  of  a  (lower) 
shadow  intervention price.  The  estimation of  such  a  price would 
certainly be  less difficult  than  in  the  quota  case.  With  reference 
19.It should  be  underscored  that  the  following  results  are  based  on  the 
small  country  assumption  or,  equivalently,  on  ~he assumption of  a  fixed 
world  reference  price  in  PSEs'  calculation.  It can  be  remarked  that  a 
fixed  reference  price  is  included  in  the  SMU  indicator  proposed  by  EC. 
93 to  the  PSET,  it is  fully  sensitive,  as  long as  the  "B"  component  is 
not  taken  into account. 
iii)  Stabilizers:  both  the  percent  PSE  and  the  PSET  are sensitive in a 
wide  spectrum of  assumptions  on  the  farmers  behaviour. 
The  message  of  our analysis,  in an  AMS  framework  and  from  an  EC  point 
of  view,  could  be  summarized  in  the  following  proposals: 
i)  to  maintain  the existing quotas  for  milk and  sugar as  a  heritage of 
the  past;  and  to directly address  the negotiations  about  these 
sectors  to  the  physical quantities exported  or  imported; 
ii)  to  strongly  implement  the stabilizer mechanisms. that are perfectly 
consistent with  the  AMS  approach:  in  this perspective a  commitment  to 
the AMS's  reduction would  be  added  to  the present  budget  worries  in 
fixing  thresholds  and  penalty prices; 
iii)  to  allow credits  for  optional supply control policies:  an  obvious 
credit should  be  the elimination  from  the  AMS  of  the  budget  payments 
related  to  such  policies;  further credit mechanisms  could  be 
envisaged,  even  if the  impact  of  these measures  has  been  negligible 
up  to  the  present  time. 
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95 INTRODUCTION 
Purpose 
POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  POLICY  REFORM 
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  rHE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Martin  Johnson,  Louis  Mahe  and  Terry Roe 
Summary  of Results 
Partial liberalization of agricultural policies  is known  to generate 
economic  benefits worldwide.  Still,  negotiatiorisof agricultural policy 
reforms  in  the  GATT  are difficult because policy  reform  impacts  real 
incomes  of  special interest groups.  This  research provides  insights  into 
the  various  economic  tradeoffs  between  policy choices  that  might  be  pursued 
by  the United  States and  the European  Community.  The  approach is 
distinguished  from  others  by  explicitly considering  the  linkages  between 
economic  and  political gains  and  losses. 
The  Economic  Model 
The  economic  analysis  is based  on  a  partial equilibrium,  world  trade 
model  of  the  production and  consumption of  cereals,  soybean meal  and  other 
vegetable proteins,  livestock feed  substitutes,  beef,  pork and  poultry, 
dairy,  and  sugar.  This  model  "Model Irlternat,ional Simplifie'de Simulation" 
(MISS)  was  developed  by  Guyomard,  Mahe  and  Trochet.  For  the majority of 
the ~e~ults summarized  below,  the model  treats  the  European Economic 
Community,  the  United  States and  the rest of  the world  as  separate 
production,  consumption  and  trading regions;  the results  from  another 
version  that  treats  the  rest of  the  OECD  as  a  separate region are also 
reported. 
The  economic  model  estimates  the  applied welfare gains  (producer, 
consumer  surplus)  for  the  mentioned  products,  consumers  and  budgetary 
expenditures.  These  values  are  inputs  into  the  measurement  of political 
gains  and  losses  from  economic  policy. 
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The  political gains  and  losses  from  policy  reforms  are based  on  the 
theory  of  public choice.  The  two  postulates of  importance  to  the results 
reported  here are  that  (a)  political authority  forms  preference over  the 
welfare of  individual  producer  and  consumer  groups  that  correspond  to  the 
above  commodity  categories,  and  to  the  rest  of society as  reflected in  the 
budget  effects of  economic  policy,  and  (b)  political preference  can  be 
revealed  from  past  policy. 
Using  these postulates,"political  p~efer~nce w~ights" are estimated 
for  each of  the mentioned  applied welfare measures.  The  general  procedure 
for  estimating  these weights  appears  in the  appendix. 
Game  theory is used  to  combine  the economic  model  with  the  theory of 
public  choice.  This  permits  the drawing  of  the  inferences  as  to what  the 
U.S.  (EC)  best strategy might  be  given  that  the  EC  (U.S.)  pursues  a 
particular policy option.  Our  estimates  of  the  value  obtained and  some  of 
the  key  qualifications  that  need  to  be  placed  on  these values  are discussed 
next. 
ESTIMATION  OF  POLITICAL  PREFERENCE  YEIGHTS 
Political assessmentsof,policies  .. candiffer.from economic  as~essments 
of  policy because,  for  the same  economic gains "or-losses,  somegr-oups ,have 
more  political influence  than others.  This  is due  to  the nature of their 
loboying process  and  other political factors  not  taken  into account  in 
economic analysis.  Measures  of  the political importance of  the  income 
gains or losses  to various  commodity  groups,  consumers,  and  the rest of 
society,  as  reflected  by  budget  gains  or losses are shown  in Table  1. 
These  measures  can  be  interpreted as  political weights  per dollar of  income 
gained or lost.  An  important  assumption affecting  the  magnitude  of  these 
estimates  is  that  the political influence of  the  various  groups  impacting 
on  agricultural policy  is revealed  in  the  policy  choices  embedded  in  the 
1986  farm  programs. 
Changes  in  the  world  economy  since  the  formulation  of  the  1986  vintage 
policies have  most  probably  increased  the  relative weight  of  the  budget  in 
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agricultural policy  formulation  in  both  the United  States and  the  European 
Comm\lnity.  It is also  likely,  given  the special circumstances  in 1986  of 
historically high  budget  support  for  agriculture  in both  the United  States 
and  the  EC,  that  the  revealed  policy weights  of  the  budget,  based  on  the 
1986  outcome,  understate its  true policy weight.  Thus,  the difficulty 
discussed  below  of  finding  an  acceptable mutually  beneficial solution 
between  the  United  States  and  the European  Community  may  be  over estimated. 
Nevertheless,  it is unlikely  that  the  rankings  of  political weights  between 
the  different  interest  groups  has  changed  appreciably since 1986. 
POLICY  SIMULATIONS 
This  section reports  on  simulations  performed  using  the  estimated 
policy-goal  functions  and  the  economic  framework  of  the  MISS  model  to 
obtain insights  into  the  possible  treaty  framework  involving  tariffication, 
recommended  by  the  US,  and  symmetrical liberalization as  measured  by  PSE, 
recommended  by  the  EC. 
Simulations  Focusing  on  U.S.  and  E.C.  Liberalization Scenarios 
General  insights  into  the  interaction between  US  and  EC  policy choices 
are provided  in Table  2.  Three  policy options were  simulated  for  both  the 
US  and  the  EC:  the status quo  (sq)  of  1986;  partial free  trade  (pft), 
meaning  free  trade  in  ce~eals~  oilseed cakes,  protein feeds,  beef,  pork and 
poultry with no  change  in sugar and  dairy  programs;  and  free  trade (ft)  in 
all seven  commodity  groups. 
The  options  for  the  EC  are:  the status quo  (sq)  of  1986;  tariffication 
of all agricultural programs  except  dairy and  sugar with a  tariff maximum 
of  20  percent  (t20%);  and  free  trade  (ft)  in all seven  commodities.  Nine 
simulations are  reported.  Each  simulation  contains  two  numbers  (V  ,V  )  us  ec 
which  result when  the  U.S.  chooses  a  policy corresponding  to  a  row  and  the 
EC  chooses  a  policy corresponding  to  a  column.  To  depict gains  and  losses 
from  the status quo,  V  and  V  are normalized at  zero  for  the status  quo  us  ec 
of  1986,  the  base  period of  the  MISS  model.  Table  2  is consistent with 
the  mentioned  hypothesis  of  the  political economy  model:  given  that  the  EC 
plays  column  (sq)  the  US  should  (and  did)  choose  row  (sq).  The  US  receives 




Table  1.  Revealed  Political Yeights  per  Unit  Value  of Income  Gained  or  Lost  to  Different Interest 
Groups  in  the  United  States and  the European  Community,  Based  on  1986  Parameters  and  Data 
\ 
United  States  European  Community 
Crops  Rank  Magnitude  Rank  Magnitude 
(Wus'j>*  (wec'j>* 
Sugar  1  1.56  1  1.57 
Dairy  2  1.29  2  1.46 
Animal  Feeds  2  1.23  4  1.32 
Grains  4  1.15  3  1.34 
Budget  5  1.00·  5  1.00 
Beef  6  .92  4  1.32 . 
Consumers  7  .87  6  . 83  ~ 
Pork  & Poultry  8  .85  7  .95 . 
*  j  =  sugar,  dairy,  animal  feeds,  grains,  budget,  beef,  consumers,  pork  & poultry.  The  implied 
"welfare  function  is: 
V. 
1  E.w ..  p .. ,1 
J  IJ  IJ  U.S.,  E.C.,  where  w.  B d  t  equals unity. 
1,  u  ge ...... 
a  ...... 
-
~# 
Table  2.  Policy Goal  Function Values  For  Alternative Policies Pursued  by  The  HISS  Hodel. 
U.S.  Policy 
Status  Quo  (sq) 
Partial Free 
Trade  (ph) 
Free  Trade  (ft) 
t 




* The  values  denote  the  tuple  (V  ;V  ).  us  ec 
E.C.  Policy 




Free Trade  (ft) 
697,-5147 
540,-4997 
-876,-4408 Similarly,  if  the  US  plays  row  (sq),  the  EC  should  (and  did)  choose  column 
(sq),  receiving 0  as  opposed  to  -2385  or  -5407.  Consequently,  given  the 
values  reported  in Table  1,  these  results show  that  both  the  US  and  the  EC 
have  an  interest  in  the  other liberalizing its agricultural policies  but 
little interest in liberalizing its own  policies. 
How  do  these results  correspond  to  the  US  and  EC  treaty proposals at 
Geneva?  The  American  proposal  called  for  free  trade  in all agricultural 
products,  but  with  the  option of providing decoupled  payments  to  producers. 
Notice (ft,ft) leads  to  a  negative V  ,a compromise  worse  than  the status  us 
quo.  Decoupled  payments  are  necessary  to  payoff  those  who  lose  from  free 
trade and  ensure a  better compromise.  The  European  proposal emphasized 
short  term  measures  to  ameliorate  immediate  surpluses.  Despite  the 
American  drought  of  1987  which  mitigated  these  problems,  the  EC  negotiating 
position still focuses  on  moderate  measures.  Table  2  is a  good  indication 
why. 
The  liberalizing options  reported  in Table  2  not  only simulate  the 
abandonment  of  the  center  piece  instruments  of  the  CAP,  variable levies  and 
restitutions,  but  they also  imply  large reductions  in agricultural 
supports.  The  resulting loss  in welfare  to  producer groups,  given  the 
estimated weights  Wec'j'  dominates  any  budgetary  savings  or increases  in 
consumer  welfare.  Hence  V  is negative for  both liberalization options.  ec 
Not  reported  in Table  2  are  the results  from  simulating a  more 
"moderate"  agreement  where  the  EC  cuts grain support  prices by  10  percent, 
oileak~ prices  to  producers  by  10  percent,  and  pork and  poultry supports  by 
3  percent.  In  exchange,  the  US  is assumed  to install a  dairy quota  to cut 
production  by  20  percent  and  allow  the  EC  to  levy a  tariff on  oilcakes  and 
protein  feeds  of  20  percent.  This set of policies  increased  V  to  198  and  us 
V  to  338.  Thus,  under  this  ec  "moderate"  agreement,  both  the  US  and  the  EC 
are better off  than  under  the status quo. 
Two  political economic  conditions motivate  the  result  of  this  moderate 
proposal and  the  results  of  tariffication in Table  2.  First,  tariffs are 
imprecise  instruments.  Adjusting  a  tariff affects  both  producer  and 
consumer  prices.  ~ithout export  subsidies or  restitutions,  producer  income 
is limited not  only  by  producer  prices  but  also  by  domestic  demand. 
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Allowing  governments  to differentiate between  producer and  consumer  prices 
effects a  more  efficient  transfer of  income  from  the agricultural  budget 
and  consumers  to  producers. 
Second,  in  the  EC  the  tariffication of oilseed  cake  policies requires  a 
drastic cut  in support  prices.  Even  modest  cuts  in grain price supports 
entail large drops  in grain  producer  welfare  hence  in V  For  example,  if  ec 
the  US  chooses  (pft)  and  the  EC  drops  the  domestic grain support  price by 
10  percent  from  the  status quo,  V  drops  from  299  (Table  2)  to  -514  (Table  ec 
3).  In  the  case of  the  moderate 'proposal,  this  loss  was  compensated 
through  the  tariffs on  oilseed cakes.  These  simulations and  those  reported 
in Table  3  bolster  the hypothesis  that  the  EC  has  interests in only 
marginal liberalizations in  trade. 
Next,  following  the  lead of  table  2  to  possible areas  of mutual  gains, 
we  report  on  two  additional set of simulations  (Table  3). 
All simulations  in Table  3  were  calculated with  the  US  pursuing  the 
partial free  trade option  (pft)  of Table  2  and  the  EC  leaves dairy and 
sugar  policies unchanged.  For  the first  three simulations,  the  EC  pursues 
tariffication in beef  and  pork and  poultry but  leaves  the  tariff level at 
the  status quo.  It then  decreases  the  tariff barrier on  grains  by  the 
first  number  and  levies a  tariff on  oilseed cakes  and  protein  feeds  equal 
to  the second  number.  Domestic  producer  prices  on  cakes  and  feed  are left 
unchanged.  Restitutions are  provided as  needed. 
The  remaining entries are simulations where  no  restitutions are allowed 
and  tariffication is  introduced.  Therefore  the  EC  may  be  self-sufficient 
but  can  only export  if domestic  price equals  world  price.  In contrast  to 
the first  three entries,  the first  number  is  the  maximum  tariff on  beef. 
The  second  number  is  the  maximum  tariff on  grains,  cakes,  and  protein 
feeds. 
Although  the  US  may  have  an interest in drastic  changes  in agricultural 
,policy,  for  example  (pft,  20%)  in Table  2  or pft  and  (30%,  20%)  option of 
Table  3,  the  EC  has  interest  in only  marginal  changes.  Even  the  relatively 
mild  liberalization  (-20%,20%)  of Table  3  results  in a  negative V  .  ec 
Furthermore,  mutually  acceptable  change,  e.g.,  the  mentioned  moderate 
103 proposal,  requires  a  complicated  use  of  policy  instruments which  make  the 
identification of  trade distortion and  liberalization more  difficult.  If 
tariffication,  no  export  subsidies,  and  no  EC  restitutions  in all 
commodities  are  the  final  aim  of  the  US  negotiating position,  then  the 
model  suggest  the  following. 
Multilateral Negotiations  Preferred  to Bilateral 
When  the  previous  policy scenarios are performed  with other  OECD 
countries  undergoing partial trade liberalization,  the  economic  and 
political feasibility of  theUS-EC  reaching.an agreement  was  almost  always 
increased.  Mutually  advantago'us  liberaliz~ftioI'1 ·toboth the  US  and  the  EC 
is enhanced  if the rest of  the  OECD  countries. are also encourgaed  to  pursue 
liberalization. 
Decoupled  Instruments 
Tariffication and  the  removal  of export  subsidies  and  export 
restitutions lead  to  large cuts  in producer  incomes.  To  achieve political 
acceptance  in  the  US  and  the  EC,  to  these  changes  can likely be  enhanced 
with decoupled  instruments.ZO.,  To  the extent  that multilateral agreements 
increase producer  incomes  through  trade  in other agricultural products,  or 
trade agricultural losses  for non-agricultural gains,  these payments  can  be 
less. 
Benefits of  Dynamic  Factors 
Taking  technical  change  and  increasing consumer  incomes  into account 
significantly  improves  both  the  economic  gains  and  apparent  political 
20.In  the  context  of  this  framework,  lessening political acceptance  amounts 
to  payments  to  groups  that  contribute  the largest  negative values  to  the 
political goal  function.  These  types  of  compensatory  payments  differ 
from  the  traditional Pareto  compensation  because  those suffering 
economic  losses  from  liberalization  that  do  not  contribute  to  large 
negative values  of  the goal  function,  i.e.,  they  have little relative 
political power,  would  receive less and  possibly  no  compensation.  In 
this  framework,  budgetary  savings  from  liberalization are sufficiently 
large so  that  compensation yields  a  zero  value  of  the otherwise negative 
goal  function.  Hence,  the  gainers  from  liberalization,  e.g.,  consumers, 
need  not  be  taxed. 






Table  3.  Policy Goal  Function Values:  US  Pursues  Partial Free  Trade  Always,  EC  Leave  Sugar 
and  Dairy  Policy  Unchanged  B~t Changes  Other  Policies 
Relative  to  1986,  The  E.C.  Pursues 
Tariffication in Beef,  Pork  & Poultry 
(Tariff  Level  at Status Quo) 
Decrease Tariff  Tariff Levied  on  Oilseed  Cakes  Political Goal  U.S.  Function Values 
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*  Effectively,  the  E.C.  decreases  domestic  price levels  by  10,  15  and  20  percent  respectively and  sets 
variable levies  to  support  these  prices. acceptability of  the  trade liberalization scenarios  studied.  Technical 
progress  tends  to  lower  production  costs  thus  maintaining  farm  income  in 
the  face  of  partial  trade  liberalization.  Budget  expenditures  increase  in 
the  presence  of  technical  change  and  no  trade liberalization.  Thus  over  a 
5  and  10  year  period,  liberalization with  technical  change yields large 
budget  savings  without  income  loss  to  farmers.  Hence,  liberalization 
becomes  more  economic  and  generates  less adverse  political pressure in  this 
dynamic  context  relative  to  a  comparative static stationary environment. 
CONCLUSION 
The  focus  of  this analysis  is  the  search  for  trade  liberalization 
positions  that  are politically acceptable  to  the  US  and  BC.  To  find  these 
positions,  this  report  has  offered a  framework  which  is based  on  the 
assumption  that  the  preferred  trade liberalization policy is one  which 
arrives at  political outcome  that  is preferred  to  the status quo  outcome  of 
the  base  period,  1986.  Given  estimates  of  political preference weights, 
the preliminary results  seem  to substantiate and  explain  the  basic 
negotiating positions  of  the  US  and  the  BC.  There are  two  main 
conclusions:  mutually  advantageous agreements  only exist in marginal 
changes  in  present agricultural policies,  and  larger  changes will require 
the multilateral negotiating  framework  of  the  GATT  or  the  linkage of 
liberalizations of  interest  to  the  BC  in other sectors  into liberalizations 
of agricultural  trade~ 
.'  j, 
That  is,  the analysis  suggests  that  the  compensation  schemes  in both 
the United  States  and  the  BC  that are  focused  on  those with  the highest 
political weights  (table 1)  appears  feasible.  Therefore,  the possibility 
of attaining a  GATT  agreement  is greatly increased if budget  savings  from 
partial trade liberalization for  both  the  United  States  and  the  BC  are 
redirected  toward  the  economic  losers with  the highest  political weights. 
The  refocusing of  the  budget  savings  toward  those  economic  losers with  the 
highest  political weights  will likely reduce  the  need  to  link US/BC 
negotiations  on  agricultural policy  to  trade liberalization by  the  rest of 
the  OBCD  countries  or  to  non-agricultural areas  that  are also subjects  of 
GATT  negotiations.  Compensating  payments  thus  helps  the  US/BC  negotiations 
to  be  de-linked  from  other  concerns. 
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The  other  important  result  is  that  both  the  US  and  the  EC  gain  from 
liberalization'in'~he rest  of  OECD.  This  strengthens  the notions  that 
negotiations  need  to  be  a  multilateral process. 
APPENDIX:  THE  CONCEPTUAL  MODEL 
" 
The  intuition 'behind  the  conceptual model  is captured  in  the  following 
story.  Agricultural policy  in  the  US  and  the  EC  has  two  parts,  goals  and 
tools,  which  are determined  in  the political economies  of  the  US  and  the 
EC.  The  political economy  of  a  country also decides  the  relative rankings 
of goals.  Each  year  the governments  of  the  US  and  the  EC  independently 
choose  from  their policy  tools  to  achieve  the goals  of agricultural policy 
given  the  policies of  the  other.  Yhen  goals  are at  odds,  tradeoffs  occur 
according  to  the  relative importance of  each goal.  The  result is  the  best 
political compromise  possible within each country.  The  conceptual  model 
presented  below  is a  mathematical  formulation  of  this  basic intuition. 
Policy  Goals 
Let  the agricultural policy goals  of  a  country  be  summarized  by  the 
indirect profit  functions  of six producer groups,  P.,  j  = g  (grains),  f 
J 
(animal  feeds),  b  (beef),  p  (pork and  poultry),  m (milk),  and  s  (sugar);  by 
consumer  welfare  in consumer  surplus  (C);  and  by  the welfare of  taxpayers 
and  other governmental  concerns  through  the net position of  the 
agricultural budgE!}.(B).  The  relative ranking '~f goals'and  the" ordering of 
compromises  is captured  in  the  following  function: 
V = ;  p  + w P  +wfPf  + wbPb  +  W P  +  W P  +  W P  + w C +  B,  g goo  ppm  m  s  s  c 
where  w.  is  the weight  given  to  the  achievement  of  a  goal  (the weight  given 
J 
to  the  budget  being one).  A greater weight  and  a  higher value of V imply 
higher  rank among  and  a  better political compromise  between  conflicting 
agricultural  pol~cy goals,  respectively. 
Policy Tools 
Let  the  policy  tools  of  both governments  be  domestic  consumer  and 
producer  prices,  tariffs,  and  quotas.  The  action space  of  each government, 
A.i  =  us,  ec,  is  the  range  over which  these  tools  can  vary.  An  action,  a., 
1  1 
stipulates a  level  for  every  tool.  Any  pair of actions  for  the  US  and  the 
107 EC,  (a  ,a  ),  determine  production and  consumption  levels  in  the  US,  the  us  ec 
EC,  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  As  a  consequence  world  prices,  trade  flows 
and  the welfare  levels  of  the  interest groups  of  V for  the  US  and  the  EC. 
Adding  the subscript  i  and  the  denoting  the  "other"  country with  the 
subscript -i,  rewrite  V as 
V.(a.,a  .)  =  E.  w  ..  P .. (a.,a  .)  +  W  .C.(a.,a.) +  B.(a.,a .), 
1  1  -1  J  J1  J1  1  -1  C1  1  1  -1  1  1  -1 
where  J  is  the set of  producer groups. 
Each  government  obtains  the  best  political compromise  given  the action 
*  of  the  other government  bychoo,sing;!n,ac:tion, ai"  from  its action space 
*  such  that  V. (a. ,a  .) > V. (aqa  . )  for all a.- &,A .• ·  Furthermore,  government 
1  1  -1  - 1  1  -1  1  1 
i's expectation of a  .  is realized  so  that  one  observes  a  pair of actions, 
*  *  -1  *  *  *  a  ,a  ),  such  that V  (a  ,a  )  > V  (a  ,a  )  for all a  & A  and  us  *ec  us*  us  ec  - us  us  ec  us  us 
V  (a  ,a  )  > V  (a  ,a  )  for all a  & A  ec  ec  us  - ec  ec  us  ec  ec 
A Differentiable Case 
Assume  governments  choose  tariffs and  domestic  prices consistently so 
that  domestic  prices differ  from  world  prices  by  the  amount  of  the  tariff. 
Thus,  governments  choose  domestic  prices and  tariffs are determined 
implicitly,  or governments  choose  tariffs and  domestic  prices are 
determined  implicitly.  Assume  governments  choose  domestic  consumer  prices 
through a  price  index.  Then  the action space  is  composed  of six producer 
prices  and  one  consumer  price.' 
If V.  is strictly concave  and  continuously differentiable over A.,  the 
1  1 
first 'order sufficient  conditions  for  an  interior maximum  are 
*  av  . 
- 1 
a k'  a  1 
*  =  1:.  w.!E .. 
J  J  J 1 
a k'  a  1 
*  +  w  • ac. 
Cl-1 
a k'  a  1 
*  +  aD.  =  0  ;  Vk  £  J,  i  = us,  ec; 
-1 
a k'  a  1 
*  *  *  where  denotes  (aus~aec) which  solve  the  first order sufficient conditions 
and  which  are  the  best  political compromises.  If government  actions  led  to 
the  best political compromises,  then  so  do  the  actions  observed  in  1986. 
108 " 
Estimation of Rankings 
The  estimation of  the  ranking and  of  V for  the  US  and  the  EC  uses  the 
first order sufficient conditions  above.  The  partial derivatives  of P.,  C, 
J 
and  B are estimated using a  partial equilibrium,  world  trade model 
calibrated for  1986.  Using  the  approximations  of  the partials,  the first 
order sufficient conditions  for  a  maximum  represent  eight equations  in 
eight  unknowns,  therefore if the  matrix, ~P.  ac.  aBil  BxB'  has  an 
-1  -1 
aa.  aa.  aa. 
1  1  1 
inverse,  the welfare weights  implicit  in  the first oraer condi tions  ar~ 
uniquely  ~P 
ac.  aB~  -1  taB~ 
.  " 
-1  -1  -1 
aa.  aa.  aai  aai  1  1 










February 6,  1990 
INTERNATIONAL  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  RESEARCH  CONSORTIUM* 
Working  Papers  Series 
Title 
Do  Macroeconomic  Variables 
Affect the Ag  Trade 
Sector?  An  Elasticities 
Analysis 
Basic  Economics  of an 
Export  Bonus  Scheme 
Risk Aversion in a  Dynamic 
Trading Game 
An  Econometric Model  of 
the European Economic 
Community's  Wheat  Sector 
Targeted Ag  Export 
Subsidies  and Social 
Welfare 
Optimum  Tariffs  in a 
Distorted Economy:  An 
Application to U.S. 
Agriculture 
Estimating Gains  from  Less 
Distorted Ag  Trade 
Author(s) 
McCalla,  Alex 
Pick,  Daniel 
Houck,  James 
Karp,  Larry 
de  Gorter,  Harry 
Meilke,  Karl 
Abbott,  Philip 
Paarlberg,  Philip 
Sharples,  Jerry 
Karp,  Larry 
Beghin,  John 
Sharples,  Jerry 
Send correspondence or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
U of California 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
U of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept of Ag  & Resource 
EconfU  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Karl Meilke 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
U of Guelph 
Guelph,  Ontario 
CANADA  NlJ  lS  1 
Dr  Philip Abbott 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
Purdue University 
W Lafayette,  IN  47907 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept  of Ag  & Resource 
EconfU  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Jerry Sharples 
USDA/ERS/IED/ETP 
628f  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York  Ave  NY 










Comparative  Advantage, 
Competitive Advantage,  and 
U.S.  Agricultural Trade 
International Negotiations 
on  Farm  Support Levels: 
The  Role  of PSEs 
The  Effect of Protection 
and  Exchange  Rate  Policies 
on Agricultural Trade: 
Implications  for Argentina, 
Brazil,  and Mexico 
Deficits and Agriculture: 
An  Alternative Parable 
An  Analysis  of Canadian 
Demand  for  Imported 
Tomatoes:  One  Market or 
Many? 
Japanese  Beef Policy and 
GATT  Negotiations:  An 
Analysis  of Reducing 
Assistance to  Beef Producers 
Grain Markets  and  the 
United States:  Trade Wars, 
Export Subsidies,  and 
Price Rivalry 
Agricultural Trade 




White,  Kelley 
Tangermann,  Stefan 
Josling,  Tim 
Pearson,  Scott 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Just,  Richard 
Chambers,  Robert 
Darko-Mensah,  Kwame 
Prentice,  Barry 
Wahl,  Thomas 
Hayes,  Dermot 
Williams,  Gary 
Houck,  James 
Krissoff,  Barry 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Send  correspondence  or 
requests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Kelley White 
USDA/ERS/IED 
732  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NY 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Tim  Josling 
Food Research Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford,  CA  94305 
Dr  Barry Krissoff 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NY 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Robert  Chambers 
Dept of Ag  & Resource 
Economics 
Univ of Maryland 
College Park,  MD  20742 
Dr  Barry Prentice 
Dept of Ag  Econ & 
Farm  Mgmt 
University of Manitoba 
Winnipeg,  Manitoba 
CANADA  R3T  2N2 
Dr  Dermot  Hayes 
Dept of Economics 
Meat  Export Research 
Center 
Iowa  State University 
Ames,  IA  50011 
.Dr  James  Houck 
Dept of Ag  Econ 
Univ of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Barry Krissoff 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NY 
















Agriculture  in the Uruguay 
Round:  What  the  North 
Might Miss 
Two-Stage Agricultural 
Import Demand  Models 
Theory and Applications 
Determinants  of U.s. 
Wheat  Producer Support 
Price:  A Time  Series 
Analysis 
Effect of Sugar Price 
Policy on U.S.  Imports 
of Processed Sugar-
containing Foods 
Market Effects of 
In-Kind Subsidies 
A Comparison of Tariffs 
and Quotas  in a 
Strategic Setting 
Targeted and Global 
Export Subsidies  and 
Welfare  Impacts 
Who  Determines  Farm 
Programs?  Agribusiness 
and the Making  of Farm 
Policy 
Report of ESCOP  Subcom-




Mabbs-Zeno,  Carl 
Ballenger,  Nicole 
Carter,  Colin 
Green,  Richard 
Pick,  Daniel 
von Witzke,  Harald 
Jabara,  Cathy 
Houck,  James 
Karp,  Larry 
Bohman,  Mary 
Carter,  Colin 
Dortman,  Jeffrey 
Alston,  Julian 
Carter,  Colin 
Who 1 genant,  M. 
Abbott,  P.C. 
Johnson,  D.G. 
Johnson,  R.S. 
Meyers,  W.H. 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
White,  T.K. 
McCalla,  A. F. 
Send correspondence or 
requests  for  copies  to; 
Dr  Nicole  Ballenger 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
624  NYAVEBG 
1301  New  York Ave  NY 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Univ of California 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Harald von Witzke 
Dept  of Ag  Economics 
Univ of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Cathy Jabara 
Office of Econ  Policy 
U.S.  Treasury Dept 
15th & Pennsylvania Ave  NY 
Washington,  DC  20220 
Dr  James  Houck 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
University of Minnesota 
St Paul,  MN  55108 
Dr  Larry Karp 
Dept of Ag  & Resource 
EconfU  of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California,  Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Colin Carter 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California,  Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California-Davis 











Does  Arbitraging Matter? 
Spatial Trade Models  and 
Discriminatory Trade 
Policies 
Export  Supply and  Import 
Demand  Elasticities in the 
Japanese Textile Industry: 
A Production Theory Approach 
The  Welfare  Effects of 
Imperfect Harmonization of 
Trade  and Industrial Policy 
Report of the Task Force 
on Tariffication and 
Rebalancing 
Report of the Task Force 
on Reinstrumentation of 
Agricultural Policies 
Report of the Task Force 
on The  Aggregate Means  of 
Support:  Potential Use 
by GATT  for Agriculture 
Agricultural Policy 
Adjustments  in East Asia: 
The  Korean Rice  Economy 
Background Papers  for 
Report of the Task Force 
on the Potential Use  by 
GATT  for Agriculture 
Optimal  Trade  Policies 
for  a  Developing  Country 
Under Uncertainty 
Author(s) 
Anania,  Giovanni 
McCalla,  Alex 
Pick,  Daniel 
Park,  Timothy 
Gatsios,  K. 
Karp,  Larry 
Josling,  Tim 
Chair 
Magiera,  Stephen 
Chair 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
Chair 
Kwon,  Yong  Dae 
Yamauchi,  Hiroshi 
Rossmiller,  G.E. 
Chair 
Choi,  E.  Kwan 
Lapan,  Harvey  E. 
Send correspondence  or 
reguests  for  copies  to: 
Dr  Alex McCalla 
Dept of Ag  Economics 
U of California-Davis 
Davis,  CA  95616 
Daniel Pick 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York Ave.  N.W. 
Washington,  DC  20005-4788 
Dr.  Larry Karp 
Dept.  of Ag  & Resource 
EconjU of California 
Berkeley,  CA  94720 
Dr.  Timothy Josling 
Food Research Institute 
Stanford University 
Stanford,  CA  94305-6084 
Stephen L.  Magiera 
USDA/ERS/ATAD 
1301  New  York Ave.,  Rm  624 
Washington,  D.C.  20005-4788 
Dr.  G.  Edward Rossmiller 
Resources  for  the Future 
Nat'l Ctr for  Food/Ag  Policy 
1616  P  Street N.W. 
Washington,  D.C.  20036 
Dr.  Hiroshi Yamauchi 
Dept.  of Ag  & Res.  Econ. 
University of Hawaii 
3050  Maile  Way 
Gilmore Hall 
Honolulu,  Hawaii  96822 
Dr.  G.  Edward Rossmiller 
Resources  for  the  Future 
Nat'l Ctr for  Food/Ag  Policy 
1616  P  Street N.W. 
Washington,  D.C.  20036 
Dr.  E.  Kwan  Choi 
Dept.  of Economics 
Iowa State University 
Ames,  Iowa  50011 *The  International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium is an  informal 
association of university and  government  economists  interested in agricultural 
trade.  Its purpose  is to foster  interaction,  improve  research capacity and  to 
focus  on relevant trade policy issues.  It is financed by  the  USDA,  ERS  and  FAS, 
Agriculture  Canada  and  the participating institutions. 
The  IATRC  Working  Paper Series provides  members  an opportunity to circulate their 
work at the  advanced draft stage  through limited distribution within the research 
and analysis  community.  The  IATRC  takes  no  political positions or responsibility 
for  the  accuracy of the data or validity of the  conclusions presented by working 
paper authors.  Further,  policy recommendations-and-' opinions  expressed by  the 
authors  do  not necessarily reflect those  of the  IATRC. 
Correspondence or requests  for  copies  of working papers  should be  addressed to  the 
authors at the addresses  listed above. 
A current list of  IATRC  publications  is available  from: 
Laura Bipes,  Administrative Director 
Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics 
University of Minnesota 
St.  Paul,  MN  55108 
U.S.A. 